Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy
Volume 15
Issue 2 Winter

Article 1

Winter 2020

Stepping into the Shoes of the Department of Justice: The
Unusual, Necessary, and Hopeful Path the Illinois Attorney
General Took to Require Police Reform in Chicago
Lisa Madigan
Cara Hendrickson
Karyn L. Bass Ehler

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, American Studies Commons, Civil Procedure Commons,
Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons,
Criminal Procedure Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Race
Commons, Law and Society Commons, Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, Legal Ethics and
Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal Studies Commons, Legislation Commons, Policy Design,
Analysis, and Evaluation Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Administration Commons, Public
Affairs Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, Race, Ethnicity and Post-Colonial Studies
Commons, Social Policy Commons, Social Welfare Commons, State and Local Government Law
Commons, Urban Studies Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Recommended Citation
Lisa Madigan, Cara Hendrickson, and Karyn L. Bass Ehler, Stepping into the Shoes of the Department of
Justice: The Unusual, Necessary, and Hopeful Path the Illinois Attorney General Took to Require Police
Reform in Chicago, 15 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y. 121 (2020).
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol15/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized
editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Copyright 2020 by Lisa Madigan, Cara Hendrickson and Karyn L. Bass Ehler
Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy

Volume 15 (Winter 2020)

Stepping into the Shoes of the Department of
Justice: The Unusual, Necessary, and Hopeful
Path the Illinois Attorney General Took to
Require Police Reform in Chicago
Lisa Madigan
Cara Hendrickson
Karyn L. Bass Ehler1
“[W]e can’t continue to let this go on. Someone has to have the will,
someone has to have the serious will, to want to have this change….”—
Testimony of Karl Brinson, President of Chicago West Side Branch of
NAACP, during the fairness hearing.2
“The decree takes an important step forward in the City of Chicago’s
ongoing efforts to repair the damaged relationship between its police
department and members of the community whom the department serves
and protects. But it is a beginning, not an end.” —Judge Robert M. Dow,
Jr., State of Illinois v. City of Chicago.3
After a long and tragic history of mistrust between police and residents in 2017,
Chicago (the City) was on the precipice of a dramatic change within its police department.
The City had recently faced months of outrage and uproar in the wake of a police shooting
of a young African American man named Laquan McDonald. Following an investigation
1
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into the Chicago Police Department (CPD), then-U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch
stood with then-Mayor Rahm Emanuel and pledged to finally do the hard work of police
reform through a court-ordered and court-enforced consent decree. We, along with many
Chicagoans, hoped for change.
But in a few short months, those hopes were dashed. President Trump appointed Jeff
Sessions as the new U.S. Attorney General. He disagreed that the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) had any role in enforcing civil rights violations by police departments. At
Chicago’s City Hall, the importance of pursuing enforceable reform was shifting. Mayor
Emanuel began pursuing an out-of-court agreement promising reforms within CPD that
lacked enforceability mechanisms. After numerous failed attempts at police reform,
Chicago would continue under a status quo that for too long has endangered residents and
police officers alike.
In our capacity at the time as the Illinois Attorney General and two of her top
deputies, we took action, believing that our office was in the best position to make this
moment in Chicago different this time around.
This Article looks at the history of policing in Chicago, how the police shooting of
Laquan McDonald galvanized Chicagoans—particularly African American youth—to
demand real, lasting change, and how our lawsuit finally brought enforceable police reform
for the benefit of communities across the City.
I. CHICAGO’S POLICE MISCONDUCT PROBLEM
A. Decades of Widespread Misconduct by CPD and Failed Attempts at Reform
To understand the decades of misconduct by the Chicago Police Department is to
understand the true challenges of real reform. We knew that change would not be easy, but
our determination for finding a better way in Chicago at this critical moment in time was
unwavering.
The CPD is the second-largest municipal police department in the United States.4
Significant and wide-ranging problems with Chicago policing have been well-documented
for more than fifty years, and in African-American and immigrant communities, policecommunity relations throughout Chicago’s history have often been strained.5 National
attention on CPD stretches at least as far back as 1968, when the nation watched images of
Chicago police officers beating demonstrators at the Democratic National Convention.6
4

With over 12,400 officers at the end of 2017, it is second in size only to the New York City Police
Department. CPD serves 2.7 million residents of the City of Chicago and is responsible for an area of 231.1
square miles. CPD is divided into twenty-two police districts, each led by a commander who oversees a
district. In 2016, it responded to 2,647,935 calls for service. CHI. POLICE DEP’T, ANN. REP. 2017 21 (2017),
https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Chicago-Police-Department-Annual-Report2017.pdf; Police Employment, Officers Per Capita Rates for U.S. Cities, GOVERNING,
https://www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/police-officers-per-capita-rates-employment-for-citydepartments.html (last updated July 2, 2018).
5
Spencer Ackerman, Inside Chicago’s Legacy of Police Abuse: Violence ‘as Routine as Traffic Lights’,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/03/chicago-policeviolence-homan-square.html.
6
Caitlin Gibson, What Happened in Chicago in 1968, and Why is Everyone Talking About It Now?, WASH.
POST (July 18, 2016), https:/www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2016/07/18/whathappened-in-chicago-in-1968-and-why-is-everyone-talking-about-it-now.html.
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Shortly thereafter, in December 1969, with significant investigative aid from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and under the direction of the Cook County State’s
Attorney, CPD raided the home of Black Panther Party leader and activist Fred Hampton
and killed the unarmed Hampton and his fellow Black Panther activist Mark Clark.7
In 1973, a blue ribbon panel led by former United States Congressman Ralph
Metcalfe identified a pattern of use of excessive force and other abuse by police directed
disproportionately at Chicago’s African American community.8 The Metcalfe Panel found
that 75% of the people killed by CPD officers in 1969 and 1970 were African Americans,9
even though African Americans composed only a third of Chicago’s population.10 In 1969
and 1970, the rate of officer-involved civilian deaths in Chicago was three times that of
New York, Los Angeles, or Detroit.11 The panel concluded that it was “the basic law
enforcement policy of [CPD] that aggressive police conduct toward citizens is desirable
and legitimate,” and that the Internal Affairs Division, the Superintendent, and the Police
Board did not “rigorously enforce [] among their subordinates proper standards of conduct
toward civilians.”12
Only a year earlier, in 1972, CPD promoted Officer Jon Burge to detective and
assigned him to Area Two on Chicago’s South Side.13 Over the nearly two decades that
followed, Burge and his subordinates at Area Two tortured and abused over 100 African
Americans in order to coerce confessions.14
After substantial community outcry, complaints from lawyers and community
members, and significant investigative journalism, two CPD employees in the late 1980s
conducted an investigation of Burge’s activities and ultimately concluded that “the
preponderance of the evidence is that abuse did occur and that it was systemic. The time
span involved covers more than ten years . . . Particular command members were aware of
the systemic abuse and perpetuated it either by actively participating in same or failing to
take any action to bring it to an end.”15
In response to this investigation, however, the City’s leadership largely dismissed
the investigation’s conclusions. CPD’s Superintendent at the time claimed that any
assertion that command officers were aware of the abuse was an “outright lie.” Further,
Mayor Richard M. Daley, who served as the Cook County State’s Attorney from 1981 to
1989 and did nothing in response to reports of Burge’s abusive tactics,16 referred to the
7

Police Kill Two Members of the Black Panther Party, HISTORY.COM (Nov. 13, 2009),
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/police-kill-two-members-of-the-black-panther-party.html.
8
METCALFE BLUE RIBBON PANEL, THE MISUSE OF POLICE AUTHORITY IN CHICAGO 2–18 (1972),
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/metcalfe-report-1972.pdf.
9
Id. at 30.
10
Id. at 45.
11
Id. at 30.
12
Id. at 32, 34.
13
John Conroy, Tools of Torture, CHI. READER (Feb. 3, 2005),
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/tools-of-torture/Content?oid=917876.html.
14
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN
THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 34 (Apr. 2016), https://chicagopatf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf.
15
CHI. POLICE DEP’T OFF. OF PROF. STANDARDS, SPECIAL PROJECT CONCLUSION REPORT 6 (1990),
https://peopleslawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Goldston-Report-with-11.2.90-Coversheet.pdf.
16
David Jackson, 13 Years of Cop Torture Alleged, CHI. TRIB., (Feb. 8, 1992),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-02-08-9201120603-story.html.
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investigation as “allegations, rumors, stories, things like that.”17 Despite revelations of the
systemic torture perpetuated by Burge and his subordinates, CPD did not meaningfully
revise its policies and programs to disincentivize officers from using excessive force
against residents, from using force disproportionately against African Americans and
Latinos, or from neglecting to report incidents in which they witnessed misconduct
committed by fellow officers. City taxpayers have paid more than $115 million for the
decades-long torture scandal tied to former police Commander Jon Burge.18
In yet another attempt at reform, in 1997, Mayor Richard M. Daley appointed a
Commission on Police Integrity after seven members of CPD were indicted on charges of
conspiracy, racketeering, and extortion.19 The Commission recommended extensive
reforms to CPD’s hiring, training, and accountability processes.20
Fast forward seventeen years, and the City had by that time paid out hundreds of
millions of dollars in police settlements.21 In 2014, the City commissioned a report,
completed pro bono by a national law firm and global consulting firm, to examine the
accountability systems for CPD.22 The resulting report recommended sweeping reforms to
CPD’s process for supervising and disciplining officers.23 However, CPD did not adopt any
of the recommendations in this city-commissioned report.24 The status of the Department
also reflected the decades of the chronic underinvestment by the City in CPD. For example,
prior to 2016, other than firearms qualification, CPD did not provide annual, mandatory
training of any kind for its officers.25
None of these reports, completed over decades, resulted in the widespread reform of
CPD that each successive expert report recommended. Rather, while each examination
repeated similarly alarming observations and reform recommendations, with the
recommendations repeatedly unheeded, many of the realities of policing within the
Department remained unchanged. Indeed, between 2008 and 2015, 74% of individuals shot
by CPD officers were African American, a proportion virtually identical to the percentage
in the Metcalfe report nearly four decades earlier.26 Further, a 2015 study by the ACLU of
Illinois concluded that between May 2014 and August 2014, African Americans
represented 72% of all Terry stops in Chicago, despite constituting only 32% of Chicago’s

17

Id.
Editorial Board, Lean in on that Police Consent Decree, CHI. TRIB., (July 20, 2018),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-consent-decree-rahm-police-20180718story.html.
19
CITY OF CHI. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON POLICE INTEGRITY
2 (1997), https://chicagopatf.org/2016/02/22/new-report-on-the-commission-on-police-integrity-1997/.
20
Id.
21
How Chicago Racked up a $662 Million Police Misconduct Bill, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 20, 2016, 7:00
AM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160320/NEWS07/160319758/how-chicago-racked-up-a662-million-police-misconduct-bill.html.
22
RON SAFER ET AL., PREVENTING AND DISCIPLINING POLICE MISCONDUCT: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CHICAGO’S POLICE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 1–2 (2014).
23
Id.
24
U.S. DEP’T of JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 72–
77, 80 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download.
25
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 13–14.
26
Id. at 25.
18
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population. Additionally, the report showed that African Americans and Latinos were
stopped at disproportionately high rates outside of minority communities.27
Between 2010 and 2014, Chicago police officers shot and killed seventy people28—
more than local officers did in any of the other ten most-populous cities in the country.29
The statistics for less-lethal use of force are similar: for example, between 2012 and 2015,
approximately 76% of the 1,886 individuals tasered by CPD officers were African
Americans.30
B. Laquan McDonald is Killed by Officer Jason Van Dyke
The longstanding policing problems in CPD reached a tipping point, on November
19, 2015, when a Cook County Circuit Court Judge ordered the City to release the video
of a police-involved shooting.31 The long sought-after video depicted an incident from the
night of October 20, 2014, when CPD officer Jason Van Dyke fatally shot Laquan
McDonald, a seventeen-year-old African American young man who was walking away
from police officers while carrying a knife.
The video showed the officer firing sixteen shots into McDonald within thirty
seconds of arriving on the scene. McDonald was standing approximately fifteen feet from
officers and walking erratically as he held a knife. There were eight officers on the scene,
and the request for backup came specifically as a request for a taser because none of the
eight officers on the scene had one. According to the criminal proffer against Jason Van
Dyke, “[a]n analysis of the video establishes that 14 to 15 seconds passed from the time
[Van Dyke] fired his first shot to clear visual evidence of a final shot. For approximately
13 of those seconds, McDonald [wa]s lying on the ground.”32
In addition to the video captured by the dashboard-mounted cameras in CPD
vehicles, a nearby Burger King restaurant had a series of outdoor security cameras,
including one located less than 100 yards from the location of the shooting.33 However,
the security footage from the camera had a gap of eighty-six minutes that covered the
duration of the shooting.34
The Chicago police union spokesperson, Pat Camden, said after the shooting that
“[t]he officers are responding to somebody with a knife in a crazed condition, who stabs
27

ACLU OF ILL., STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 3, 7, 9–10 (Mar. 2015), https://www.acluil.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf.
28
Andrew Schroedter, Fatal Shootings by Chicago Police: Tops Among Biggest U.S. Cities, BETTER GOV’T
ASS’N (July 26, 2015), https://www.bettergov.org/news/fatal-shootings-by-chicago-police-tops-amongbiggest-us-cities/.
29
Id.
30
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 36.
31
Megan Crepeau et al., How the Day Unfolded: Inside the Courtroom for Former Chicago Police Officer
Jason Van Dyke's Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2019),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-laquan-mcdonald-jason-van-dyke-sentencing20190118-story.html.
32
People’s Factual Proffer in Support of Setting Bond, Illinois v. Van Dyke, No. 15-1278:23 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
filed Jan. 24, 2015).
33
Carol Marin & Don Moseley, Missing Minutes from Security Video Raises Questions, NBC CHI. (May
26, 2015), https://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/laquan-mcdonald-investigation-305105631.html.
34
Id. After the shooting, police officers who were canvassing the area for additional witness and
investigative information obtained access to the security videos at the Burger King, which raised questions
as to whether the police officers tampered with the security footage.

125

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2020

out tires on a vehicle and tires on a squad car. You obviously aren’t going to sit down and
have a cup of coffee with them. He is a very serious threat to the officers, and he leaves
them no choice at that point but to defend themselves.”35
In April 2015, the City Council approved a $5 million settlement with the McDonald
family to resolve legal claims prior to a lawsuit even being filed.36
In August 2015, after CPD refused to produce the video of the shooting captured on
officers’ dashboard cameras, a Chicago journalist sued for release of the video under the
Illinois Freedom of Information Act.37 On November 24, 2015, the Cook County State’s
Attorney, Anita Alvarez, charged Jason Van Dyke with first-degree murder.38 A few hours
later, the City released the videotape of the shooting pursuant to the November 19 court
order.39
Once the City released the video, public condemnation of the officer’s actions—and
the City’s response to the shooting—were swift. Within hours of the video’s release,
hundreds of protesters demonstrated in downtown streets.40 Additional public protests
flooded Chicago’s main shopping district, Michigan Avenue, on Black Friday, the largest
shopping day of the year. Protesters marched down Michigan Avenue chanting “16 shots!”,
blocked the entrances to stores, and stopped traffic.41
C. Mayor Emanuel Reacts to Public Outrage
Distrust in the City’s and CPD’s leadership to honestly and fairly address the
McDonald shooting was high. After the release of the footage of McDonald’s death,
community leaders and activists alleged that Mayor Emanuel had covered up the videotape
and refused to release it in an effort to win his re-election bid.42 Protestors called for the
35

Chicago Police Department Consent Decree: A Timeline of the Push for Reforms, CBS CHI. (Jul. 27,
2018), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2018/07/27/chicago-police-consent-decree-timeline/html; see also
Marissa Bailey, Police Shoot, Kill Knife-Wielding Teen on South Side, CBS CHI. (Oct. 21, 2014),
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/10/21/police-shoot-kill-knife-wielding-teen-on-south-side/.
36
Bill Ruthhart, Despite Challenges, Mayor Confident About Re-election, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 11, 2017),
http://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/tribune/article_popover.aspx?guid=a8786e99-87f5-4d7d-afeae8553d04fed5.html.
37
Compl. at 1, Smith v. Chi. Police Dep’t, 2015-CH-11780 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 5, 2015); Illinois
Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (2017); Matt Ford, The Killing of Laquan McDonald,
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/chicago-policeindictment/417531/.
38
Ford, supra note 37.
39
Kori Rumore & Chad Yoder, Minute by Minute: How Jason Van Dyke Shot Laquan McDonald, CHI.
TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2019, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquan-mcdonald/ct-jason-vandyke-laquanmcdonald-timeline-htmlstory.html.
40
Alex Johnson, Protestors Block Chicago Streets Over Video of Laquan McDonald’s Killing, NBC NEWS,
(Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/video-laquan-mcdonalds-killing-be-releasedchicago-braces-protests-n469171.html.
41
Activists March on Magnificent Mile to Protest Laquan McDonald Shooting, CBS CHI. (Nov. 27, 2015),
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2015/11/27/protest-organizers-plan-magnificent-mile-march-over-laquanmcdonalds-death/.
42
Edward McClelland, Rahm Emanuel's Nixon Moment: The Laquan McDonald Coverup Will Be His
Legacy, SALON (Dec. 2, 2015, 3:59 PM),
https://www.salon.com/2015/12/02/rahm_emanuels_nixon_moment/. In April 2015, Mayor Rahm Emanuel
had won a relatively close re-election following the first mayoral runoff in more than 16 years. Julie
Bosman, Rahm Emanuel Wins Runoff Election to Secure 2nd Term as Chicago Mayor, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7,
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firing of Police Superintendent Garry McCarthy and for the resignation of Mayor
Emanuel.43
In response to the outrage caused by the videotape, Mayor Emanuel fired police
Superintendent Garry McCarthy on December 1, 2015.44 The same day, he announced the
creation of yet another blue-ribbon task force to review the systems of training, oversight,
and accountability for CPD officers. This time, the panel was called the Police
Accountability Task Force (PATF). The Mayor appointed Lori Lightfoot, the President of
the Police Board and a partner at the large Chicago law firm Mayer Brown, to serve as one
of several co-chairs of the Task Force. Mayor Emanuel charged the PATF with
recommending reforms to (1) improve independent oversight of police misconduct; (2)
ensure that officers with repeated complaints are identified and evaluated appropriately;
and (3) establish best practices for the release of videos of police-involved incidents.45
D. Calls for the U.S. Department of Justice to Investigate CPD
On December 1, 2015, Lisa Madigan, as Illinois Attorney General, wrote to the
United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch asking her, with urgency, to initiate a pattern
or practice investigation into whether CPD had committed systemic violations of federal
law.
Addressing these problems and repairing [] CPD’s relationship with the
community will require a fundamental redirection of Chicago’s approach to
law enforcement and accountability for police abuse . . . Trust in the
Chicago Police Department is broken, especially in communities of color in
the City of Chicago . . . The children of Chicago deserve to grow up in a
city in which they are safe, protected and served by a police force that is fit
for this fine [c]ity—something that many in our community do not
experience today.46
Specifically, we asked DOJ to (1) investigate CPD’s use of force, including deadly
force; (2) examine the adequacy of CPD’s review and investigation of officers’ use of force
and investigate all allegations of misconduct; (3) evaluate CPD’s provision of training,

2015), nytimes/com/2015/04/08/us/rahm-emanuel-retains-seat-as-chicagos-mayor.html. Mayor Emanuel’s
runoff opponent, Cook County Commissioner Jesus “Chuy” Garcia, asserted that Mayor Emanuel was not
addressing the concerns of Chicago’s working class and diverse neighborhoods. Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Press Release, Mayor’s Office, (Dec. 1, 2015), Mayor Emanuel Announces Task Force on Police
Accountability, found at
https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2015/december/Task-ForcePolice.html.
46
Madigan Calls for U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division to Investigate Chicago Police
Department, NBC CHI. (Dec. 1, 2015, 4:58 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/MadiganCalls-for-Federal-Investigation-of-Chicago-Police-Department-359718081.html; see also Mark Guarino,
Illinois Attorney General Asks Justice Department for Civil Rights Investigation into Chicago Police,
WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2015, 7:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2015/12/01/illinois-attorney-general-asks-justice-dept-for-civil-rights-investigation-into-thechicago-police department/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.72047b768684.html.
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equipment, and supervision of officers; and (4) examine whether a pattern or practice of
discriminatory policing exists.
Mayor Emanuel called the request for an investigation “misguided” and opposed it.47
National political leaders joined our call in the following days.48 In addition, there was
overwhelming public support and calls from editorial boards for an independent
investigation.49 “Faced with a rising tide of criticism—including from then-Democratic
presidential nominee Hillary Clinton—Emanuel had no choice but to drop his opposition
to the probe.”50
A week later, on December 7, 2015, DOJ announced that its Civil Rights Division
would open a pattern or practice investigation to determine whether CPD engaged in a
discriminatory pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, including in the use of
excessive force.51 We were confident that DOJ’s conclusions would lead us one step closer
to real police reform in Chicago. At this point, we believed that DOJ and the City of
Chicago would pursue the recommended path forward.
E. Reports Confirm Widespread Problems with CPD
The PATF, which Mayor Emanuel had appointed, released its 183-page report in
April 2016 with details and findings about a broad range of issues organized around five
areas: video release policies, de-escalation, community and police reforms, early
intervention and personnel concerns, and legal oversight and accountability. The PATF
concluded that “CPD’s response to the violence [in Chicago] is not sufficiently imbued
with Constitutional policing and tactics,” and that “CPD’s own data gives validity to the
widely held belief [that] the police have no regard for the sanctity of life when it comes to
people of color.”52 Both the PATF’s in-depth analysis and its extensive recommendations
provided a damning picture of the severe impact of racism in the city and the significant
problems at CPD.53
47

Bill Ruthhart & Annie Sweeney, Emanuel Now Open to Justice Department Review of Chicago Police,
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-rahm-emanuel-justice-departmentchicago-police-20151203-story.html; Tony Arnold & Lauren Chooljian, Madigan Calls for Investigation of
Chicago Police, ILL. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.northernpublicradio.org/post/madigan-callsinvestigation-chicago-police-0.
48
Timothy M. Phelps et al., Feds to Conduct Civil Rights Probe of Chicago Police, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 7,
2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-police-justice-department-investigates-met20151206-story.html.
49
Alexandra Silets, Newspaper Editorial Boards Weigh In on Laquan McDonald Shooting, WTTW (Nov.
30, 2015), https://news.wttw.com/2015/11/30/newspaper-editorial-boards-weigh-laquan-mcdonaldshooting.
50
Heather Cherone, Chicago Police Reform Efforts Need Federal Oversight, Rahm Says, DNA INFO (Aug.
29, 2017), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20170829/jefferson-park/chicago-police-reform-efforts-needfederal-oversight-rahm-finally-admits/.
51
U.S. Department of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Opens Pattern or Practice Investigation
into the Chicago Police Department (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-departmentopens-pattern-or-practice-investigation-chicago-police-department.
52
POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 25.
53
Lori Lightfoot, the co-chair of PATF, would go on to announce in 2018 that she was running for mayor
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On January 13, 2017, DOJ confirmed the legitimacy of the decades-long call for
reform of the CPD. At the conclusion of its year-long investigation, DOJ issued a 161-page
report (DOJ Report) concluding that “CPD officers engage in a pattern or practice of using
force, including deadly force, that is unreasonable,” in violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.54 DOJ’s investigation revealed that this pattern or
practice, which disproportionately impacts African American and Latino communities in
Chicago, “is largely attributable to systemic deficiencies within CPD and the City” in the
training and supervision of officers, accountability systems, and the collection and
reporting of data on officer use of force.55 In addition, DOJ determined that the lack of
effective community-oriented policing strategies, unaddressed racially discriminatory
conduct by officers, and insufficient support for officer wellness contributed to the pattern
or practice of unconstitutional use of force.56 The DOJ Report concluded that these
systemic deficiencies pervade all aspects of policing, including officer training,
supervision, accountability mechanisms, and officer support structures, and reinforce a
“code of silence” in which CPD officers lie and undertake affirmative efforts to conceal
evidence of misconduct.57 The DOJ Report also found that the “impact of CPD’s pattern
of unreasonable force fall[s] heaviest on predominately black and Latino
neighborhoods.”58
We were not surprised by these findings, but we knew that DOJ’s recommendations
for real police reform would not be sustainable unless a court enforced them. To remedy
these systemic deficiencies, the DOJ Report made ninety-nine specific recommendations
regarding reforms in the areas of use of force, accountability, training, supervision, officer
wellness and safety, data collection and transparency, promotions, and community
policing.59 In making its recommendations, the DOJ Report emphasized that the required
reforms
will likely not happen or be sustained without the reform tools of an
independent monitoring team and a court order … Together, an independent
monitor and court decree will make it much more certain that Chicago is
finally able to eliminate patterns of unconstitutional conduct, and can
bolster community confidence to make policing in Chicago more effective
and less dangerous.60
When DOJ released its report, findings and recommendations, DOJ officials held a
joint press conference with Chicago officials to announce the conclusion of their
investigation.61 Mayor Emanuel stood with Attorney General Lynch and entered into an
Agreement in Principle between the City and DOJ to work together to negotiate a consent
U.S. DEP’T of JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, supra note 24, at 5.
Id. at 5–15.
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decree to be entered as an order in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois.62 The Agreement also committed to specifying the selection and appointment
process for an independent monitor to evaluate the City’s progress under the consent
decree.63 The signing of this Agreement was an important moment for Chicago. We were
encouraged to see things progressing with a sense of cooperation and coordination.
F. City Officials Respond with Reluctance
Following the commencement of DOJ’s investigation, the City made changes to its
law enforcement practices. But the changes were insufficient to eliminate the decades-old
policies, customs, and practices of unlawful conduct and to ensure they would not recur. 64
The City put in place a new use of force policy, rolled out more body-worn cameras
for officers, and distributed more tasers.65 The City initiated some reform efforts, including
providing refresher training for officers on use of force policies for the first time and
reconfiguring the police accountability arm—the Independent Police Review Authority
(IPRA)—and thereby creating a new version of this oversight body called the Civilian
Office of Police Accountability (COPA).66
However, even the incremental reforms announced by the City faced steep
opposition from the rank and file officer union, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). For
example, when IPRA became COPA, the FOP opposed the changes. Union spokesman
Martin Prieb wrote in an email: “Based on our early observations, the FOP does not believe
our officers will be investigated fairly under COPA . . . Our collective bargaining
agreement does not recognize the authority of COPA. Nevertheless, we have already taken
steps to bolster the legal defense of our members and to go on the offensive.”67
Despite the City’s incremental changes to policing, a local investigative news
analysis in September 2017 concluded that only six of the DOJ’s ninety-nine recommended
reforms had been fully implemented.68 In arriving at that conclusion, reporter Jonah
Newman explained that because there was no independent monitor reporting on the City’s

Id. See also U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE CITY OF CHICAGO REGARDING THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (Jan.
13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925901/download [hereinafter AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE].
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progress, he relied on “the city’s own public statements that [] CPD has put out.”69 He
stated, “[f]or the most part, we took the city at their word” that any of the reforms had in
fact been implemented.70 But CPD had yet to even begin many of the far-reaching
recommendations for reform made by DOJ and the PATF. This lack of action led to
increasing skepticism by the public and concern that the Mayor’s attempt at actual,
dedicated, and sustainable police reform would falter in the same ways each previous
attempt had.
G. High Costs of Police Misconduct and Under-Resourced Department
Further adding to the growing pressure for police reform, the City’s defense of
lawsuits alleging police misconduct had taken a severe financial toll on the taxpayers.
Between 2004 and 2016 alone, the City paid approximately $662 million in settlements,
judgments, and outside legal fees for police misconduct cases. 71 Yet, only half of these
cases have resulted in official disciplinary investigations, and fewer than four percent of
those investigations have resulted in disciplinary recommendations.72 These payouts have
included spectacularly large settlements in high profile cases—including over $115 million
dollars paid out to plaintiffs due to torture and wrongful conviction suits stemming from
the notorious Jon Burge related cases.73 However, the numbers also represent the aggregate
of many smaller payments—on average one settlement every two days—with a median
payout of $50,000.74 Those costs routinely exceed the budget the City has set aside for
legal settlements, causing the City to borrow to cover the costs—costs that alternatively
could be used to institute real reform required by a consent decree. 75 The City Council
approved issuing $100 million in bonds in 2016 and 2017 just to cover the costs of
lawsuits.76
In addition to the toll on the City’s taxpayers, officers were also feeling the burden
of the problems with the City’s underinvestment in policing and police officers in Chicago.
Between 2013 and 2015, CPD’s officer suicide rate was 29.4 per 100,000, which was sixty
percent higher than the national average for law enforcement officers.77
With the torrent of bad news and taxpayer obligations, many had asked: How does
this happen? Where is the accountability? There had been assertions for years that CPD
maintained a “code of silence”—that officers would lie, not report or refuse to cooperate
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in investigations regarding allegations of misconduct by their fellow officers. Former CPD
Superintendent Jody Weis, who had also served in the FBI, stated:
The culture here is if you get in trouble, if there’s an administrative inquiry,
you can lie and do whatever you can to get out of it because the penalty for
lying will never be greater than the trouble you’re in. . . to say [the ‘Thin
Blue Line’] doesn’t exist, is naïve.78
Former Superintendent Weis identified that the retaliation an officer would receive from
other officers for crossing that “Thin Blue Line” and breaking the code of silence would
be far greater than any discipline the officer might face from CPD or the Police Board.
The data bore out this “Thin Blue Line” effect too. Only two percent of the 28,567
misconduct complaints filed between March 2011 and September 2015 resulted in actual
discipline.79 The results for officer-involved shootings were even worse: of the 409 officerinvolved shootings between October 2007 and September 2015, only two (0.49%) were
found to be unjustified shootings.80
Mayor Emanuel, following the release of the video of the shooting of Laquan
McDonald, stated in a speech before the City Council, “This problem is sometimes referred
to as the Thin Blue Line. Other times it is referred to as the code of silence. It is the tendency
to ignore, deny or in some cases cover-up the bad actions of a colleague or colleagues.”81
Though Mayor Emanuel himself publicly acknowledged the existence of a code of
silence,82 his hand-selected Police Superintendent, Eddie Johnson, refused to acknowledge
the code of silence in the wake of the investigation and outcry of the Laquan McDonald
shooting. In March 2018, Superintendent Johnson was asked about the Mayor’s remarks
and his own observations of the code of silence in a deposition. He denied that he had ever
seen or witnessed a code of silence in the Chicago Police Department.83 He said: “I’ve
been a cop now for about 30 years. I’ve never heard police officers talking about, in my
experience, code of silence . . . Again, in my personal experience, I’m not sure what code
of silence means.”84
H. DOJ Makes an About Face
On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump was sworn in as President of the United States,
and the federal government’s concern about decades of police misconduct changed. The
78
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President nominated the U.S. Senator from Alabama, Jeff Sessions, to serve as United
States Attorney General. Almost immediately, DOJ took a contradictory position than it
had only weeks earlier when it released its report about CPD. Typically, after issuing a
report and recommendations, DOJ negotiates a consent decree with an independent
monitor to cover all of the changes that the preceding investigation determined that a police
department needed for reform. However, Attorney General Sessions made a clear shift in
DOJ’s approach and pronounced that “protect[ing] and respect[ing] the civil rights of all
members of the public” and “implement[ing] best practices in policing” are “first and
foremost, tasks for state, local, and tribal law enforcement.”85 Sessions’ view was that
police misconduct is not systemic or structural but is limited to a few bad cops.86 Attorney
General Sessions and President Trump also frequently used Chicago as a punching bag.
Sessions said, “the rule of law has broken down,” pointing to Chicago’s immigrant-friendly
policies known as sanctuary policies as “one sad example of that.”87
The Trump administration had sought to delay a consent decree approval process in
Baltimore.88 There, DOJ had finalized a consent decree in the last days of the Obama
administration and had filed it in the federal district court for its approval. However, after
the change in administration, the Sessions’ DOJ sought a delay in the court’s review of the
agreement. Sessions said, “I have grave concerns that some provisions of this decree will
reduce the lawful powers of the police department and result in a less safe city.”89 While
the court approved the Baltimore consent decree despite DOJ’s request for a delay, the
effect the new Sessions’ DOJ would have on Chicago police reform was less clear. Sessions
also opposed the appointment of an independent monitor to evaluate and support the
progress of a municipality’s reform efforts. Despite Mayor Emanuel’s Agreement in
Principle with DOJ,90 both a court-enforced consent decree and an independent monitor to
oversee the reforms were now in jeopardy for Chicago.
We faced a tough situation. We knew Chicago needed a consent decree and an
independent monitor to achieve real reform. Could we go it alone without DOJ? Was there
a path forward?
II. FILLING THE ROLE OF DOJ
As Attorney General Sessions announced that policing reform was a matter to be
dealt with at the state and local levels, the City was faced with a wide-ranging and damning
Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions to Heads of Dep’t Components and U.S. Attorneys,
Supporting Federal, State, Local and Tribal Law Enforcement (Mar. 31, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/954916/download.
86
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87
Shibani Mahtani, Illinois to Form Consent Decree for Police Revamp in Chicago, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 29,
2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/illinois-to-form-consent-decree-for-police-revamp-in-chicago1504036717.
88
Aruna Viswanatha & Scott Calvert, Justice Department Seeks to Delay Police Oversight in Baltimore,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-seek-delay-in-baltimorepolice-consent-decree-1491271343.
89
Daniel Victor, Baltimore Will Get Overhaul of Police., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2017), at A18,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/baltimore-justice-department-police-consent-decree.html.
90
AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 2.
85

133

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY

[2020

DOJ report, an inflammatory report from the PATF, a clamor over the history of police
brutality in the city, community outrage over the Laquan McDonald video, and a new
Superintendent but no firm roadmap for reform.
A. The City Needed a Federal Court Order to Ensure Reform Was Carried Out
Within the Illinois Attorney General’s Office, we knew a consent decree was
essential to ensuring real, sustainable, and lasting reform. We were unwilling to accept
anything less. Though we recognized that police reform is always a difficult road,
especially with the high number of recommended changes, we also understood that the
only way for it to be sustainable, lasting reform would be for entry of a consent decree
overseen by a federal judge and an independent monitor to assess and support that progress.
A consent decree would need to cover several substantive areas of reform to address
the complex, deeply entrenched deficiencies at CPD, including departmental policies and
practices, such as use of force and bias-based policing, training, supervision and
accountability systems, officer wellness programs, and community engagement.91
In addition, a consent decree would require an independent, third-party monitor to
submit reports to the court—not only to the parties—and to make the reports available to
the public. A consent decree would require public access to status hearings regarding the
progress of the consent decree. The hearings would provide an effective forum to discuss
and resolve implementation challenges and disagreements between the parties. In the event
the parties could not resolve a material disagreement, the court would possess jurisdiction
to resolve the dispute. Finally, in the event the City failed to comply with a consent decree,
the court could oversee contempt proceedings.
To the surprise of many, in June 2017, the City revealed it was in the process of
negotiating an Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with DOJ to address police reform.
The City announced that it had reached an “agreement in principle” with the Trump
Administration’s DOJ—the same administration that proudly declared its disbelief in the
need for police reform. DOJ responded that it had not agreed on any format for Chicago
police reform and was reviewing a proposal from the Chicago Mayor’s office.92 The City
acknowledged that its proposal did not include federal court oversight of reforms. 93 Lack
of court oversight was a reversal of the City’s position from a few months earlier, when
the Mayor had agreed with the Obama DOJ that it would negotiate a consent decree.94
91
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Our concern was the lack of accountability and the watered-down version of reform
that would result with the MOA that the City had proposed with DOJ.95 In contrast to the
robust mechanisms for accountability in a consent decree, such as an independent monitor
who would report to the court on progress under the consent decree or a party’s ability to
file a motion with the court to enforce the consent decree should the City breach its
obligations, an MOA only affords the remedy of a breach of contract action. Such a remedy
is less expedient and less transparent.
Without federal judicial oversight, the City’s and DOJ’s MOA would have left
Chicago with too much leeway to pursue less than comprehensive, lasting reform of all
critical aspects of CPD’s use of force, as well as officer training, supervision,
accountability, and wellness. It was clear to us and most Chicagoans that police reform
without independent oversight and accountability would fail, as it had in the past. As the
Obama DOJ noted in its Report, “[t]ogether, an independent monitor and court decree will
make it much more certain that Chicago is finally able to eliminate patterns of
unconstitutional conduct, and can bolster community confidence to make policing in
Chicago more effective and less dangerous.”96
B. We Oppose the City’s Effort to Pursue Anything Less Than a Consent Decree
The City’s attempt to end-run around its previous commitment to a police reform
consent decree by proposing an MOA with DOJ was met with widespread criticism. We
called the City’s negotiation with a DOJ that does not believe in the need for constitutional
policing “ludicrous.”97 We called on Mayor Emanuel to “stop wasting time” and to commit
to a transparent process that would result in a consent decree.98 The Mayor refused to
respond to our call for a consent decree, instead suggesting that the format of the agreement
was not important and that an MOA with DOJ would produce the same results as a courtordered consent decree.99 We suggested that a lawsuit to seek a consent decree was a
possibility, but called it a “last option.”100
Our call for a consent decree set off a series of discussions over several months with
Mayor Emanuel, the City Corporation Counsel, CPD, and our office.101 We continued to
call for a consent decree, and a growing chorus of the City’s civic leaders, religious leaders,
elected officials, community activists, and civil rights leaders added their objections to the
City’s inadequate plan to pursue reforms through an MOA with DOJ.
Prominent newspaper editorial boards entered the conversation as well. The Editorial
Board of the Chicago Sun-Times wrote:
We urge the mayor to join with Madigan and others in negotiating a
practical and rigorously scheduled federal consent decree, which would
95
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mean court oversight . . . When Madigan’s office, civil liberties groups,
influential community organizations and editorial boards line up to warn
that anything short of a formal consent decree might not earn the public’s
trust, it’s good to listen.102
The Editorial Board of the New York Times urged the Mayor to act too.103 In
agreeing with Attorney General Madigan’s claim that “[t]here has never been systemic and
comprehensive police reform in Chicago because there has never been an enforceable court
order requiring it,” the Times Editorial Board said, “Mayor Emanuel should take those
words to heart and act.”104
Activists and community members who had been organizing around police reform
and community oversight of CPD did not believe that the City could reform itself. Many
were concerned by reports of the City’s proposal of an MOA with DOJ and troubled that
it would produce a watered-down version of reform. Taking matters into their own hands,
individual plaintiffs as well as a coalition of community organizations led by Black Lives
Matter Chicago, Blocks Together, Brighton Park Neighborhood Association, Chicago
Urban League, Justice For Families, NAACP Westside Branch, Network 49, Women’s All
Points Bulletin, and 411 Movement for Pierre Loury filed a civil rights lawsuit (the
Campbell lawsuit) on June 14, 2017.105 The coalition’s litigation sought a consent decree
and accused the City of trying to cut a “back-room deal” with Attorney General
Sessions.106
The City fought the Campbell lawsuit and refused to engage in discussions about a
consent decree with the Campbell plaintiffs.107 While the City did not immediately respond
directly to the lawsuit after it was filed, the City proclaimed its commitment to reform and
pointed to its own plans to pursue reform.108 In its legal filing, the City moved to dismiss
the lawsuit brought by the civil rights groups, asserting that a consent decree is not
necessary because the practices that gave rise to the DOJ investigation “are no longer in
place in light of CPD’s extensive, ongoing reform efforts.”109 In addition, the City
challenged the standing of the plaintiffs.110
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Yet, activists and community leaders remained unconvinced based on their prior
experiences with police reform efforts in the city. Mecole Jordan, a lead organizer with
United Congress and the Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability (GAPA), explained
community skepticism in the City’s ability to reform itself:
We’ve been hearing Mayor Emanuel and Supt. Eddie Johnson say, ‘Trust
me, trust us,’ . . . But the residents that we work with every single day did
trust the city leaders. They trusted them to serve and protect. They trusted
them to tell the truth. They trusted them not to violate their civil rights. But
that trust is now severely broken.111
Despite the overwhelming calls for a consent decree to govern Chicago police
reform, the Mayor remained staunchly opposed.112 He dismissed the skepticism about the
City’s ability and willingness to reform without a consent decree: “[W]e are actually in the
middle of making all the changes without a court order, and continue to do it; and we will
do it.”113 He stuck to this message—that change was already occurring—and he didn’t need
any more assistance. We rejected that notion and forged ahead.
The City contended that it had spent months negotiating an MOA, which the Mayor
asserted would suffice to ensure meaningful changes.114 Mayor Emanuel’s floor leader in
the City Council, Alderman Pat O’Connor, expressed concerns about the role of a federal
judge in police reform: “If we do what those reports recommend, what role would the judge
play—other than adding another layer of bureaucracy and encumbering the city with
millions and millions of dollars in more reporting, more monitoring?”115
In response to calls for transparency, the City refused to publicly release its draft
MOA with DOJ.116 Instead, the City allowed a few key stakeholders to review the draft
privately. One of those stakeholders, then-Police Board President and PATF Co-Chair Lori
Lightfoot, stated that the draft had “no specific list of reforms that must be achieved; no
deadline that must be met; no commitment of personnel and funding and no commitment
to change [the] police contract.”117 Our office also reviewed the draft and found that it fell
short of the commitment needed to reform CPD.
Skeptical of this potential watered-down agreement with DOJ, Christy Lopez, one
of the leaders of DOJ’s CPD investigation, spoke out in favor of a consent decree: “I’ve
Chi. Tribune Staff, Morning Spin: Rauner Won’t Sign 911 Funding Plan that Could Increase Phone
Taxes, CHI. TRIB. (June 23, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-bruce-rauner-phone-fees20170623-story.html.
112
Greg Hinz, Chicago Police Reform Suit Filed by Attorney General Madigan, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Aug.
29, 2017), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20170829/BLOGS02/170829863/chicago-policereform-suit-filed-by-attorney-general-madigan.html.
113
Chi. Trib. Staff, supra note 111.
114
David Schaper, Illinois Officials Ask Courts to Order Changes in Chicago Police Policies, NPR (Aug.
30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/30/547377201/illinois-officials-ask-courts-toorder-changes-in-chicago-police-policies.html.
115
Fran Spielman, Mayor Rahm Emanuel at a Crossroads on Police Reform, CHI. SUN-TIMES (June 14,
2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2017/6/14/18332691/mayor-rahm-emanuel-at-a-crossroads-on-policereform.html.
116
Spielman, supra note 101.
117
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never seen a department that screams out for a consent decree more than Chicago. To let
this opportunity pass with this fig leaf of an agreement is really pretty tragic for the people
of Chicago.”118
With no other framework in place to secure necessary reforms, we were left with no
other choice. We sued the City of Chicago in federal court.
C. We Sue the City of Chicago in Pursuit of a Police Reform Consent Decree
After a summer of the City dragging its feet on real and lasting reform and refusing
to discuss a consent decree framework with the community groups that filed suit, we
informed the City of our intentions to bring a lawsuit and seek a consent decree overseen
by a federal judge. After weeks of discussions we “agreed that meaningful and sustainable
reform requires an enforceable consent decree.”119 As the New York Times Editorial Board
observed, “[t]he city had little choice but to embrace the lawsuit.”120 The case was filed on
August 29, 2017. As we said when we filed, “[w]e are stepping into the shoes of the
Department of Justice, which abandoned this effort . . . It is clear that the Trump
administration’s view of policing is not consistent with our own. [Our] office will take the
lead.”121
At the same time that we filed the lawsuit against the City, Mayor Emanuel and CPD
Superintendent Johnson committed to work with us to negotiate an enforceable consent
decree. While Mayor Emanuel agreed to enter into consent decree negotiations with us, he
reluctantly reversed his position on whether the City needed federal oversight.122 Mayor
Emanuel and Superintendent Johnson asked to participate in the press conference when the
suit was announced, and we agreed. At the press conference, Superintendent Johnson said
“I don’t think this is a blow [to the City].”123 In our lawsuit, we conveyed our mission to
deliver for Chicagoans a police department that respects their constitutional rights, protects
their safety, and supports the officers who take on these vital responsibilities.
D. With No Statute that Explicitly Provides Authority, We Use Our Parens Patrie
Powers to Pursue Fourth Amendment and State Civil Rights Claims
Our Complaint, based on the findings and recommendations of the DOJ and PATF
reports, sought injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.

Dan Hinkel et al., Other Cities' Approach to Police Reform Without Judge’s Oversight May Color
Chicago’s, CHI. TRIB. (June 9, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-chicago-police-consentdecree-met-20170609-1-story.html.
119
Bill Ruthhart, Annie Sweeney, and John Byrne, AG Madigan Sues to Enforce Chicago Police Reform;
Emanuel Pledges Cooperation, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 30, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ctemanuel-madigan-consent-decree-met-0830-20170829-story.html+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us.html.
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Constitution,124 Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution,125 the Illinois Civil Rights
Act of 2003,126 and the Illinois Human Rights Act.127
In particular, the Complaint contained four counts. Importantly, the Complaint
contained a single federal count that alleged the City and its agents maintain a policy,
custom, or practice of using force against persons in Chicago without lawful justification,
in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.128
We also made the same claim under Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution, which,
similar to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, prohibits unreasonable search
and seizure.129 In addition, our Complaint alleged claims under the Illinois Civil Rights Act
of 2003, asserting that the City’s law enforcement practices have a disproportionate impact
on African Americans and Latinos.130 Finally, we asserted a claim under the Illinois Human
Rights Act, alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination that denies African Americans
and Latinos in Chicago the full and equal enjoyment of the privileges of the City’s law
enforcement services.131
Our lawsuit seeking police reform in the City of Chicago was unprecedented in more
ways than one. CPD would become the largest police department to ever face a police
consent decree.132 The scope of the decree was also unparalleled, covering the broad and
deep problems identified by DOJ and systemic deficiencies in nearly every area of CPD
operations. Moreover, the decision to file a lawsuit first, rather than at the conclusion of
successful negotiations, was much more aggressive than the DOJ’s typical approach. DOJ
rarely files suits against police departments engaged in federal consent decree negotiations.
In addition, the fact that a state attorney general was leading the sought-after police
reform, rather than DOJ, was incredibly rare, but well within our jurisdiction. DOJ pursues
police reform under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42
U.S.C. § 14141.133 The statute gives DOJ the authority to pursue equitable and declarative
relief to eliminate a pattern or practice of unconstitutional or unlawful conduct in a civil
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action.134 Outside of the authority provided under federal law, almost no states have
statutes that provide similar authority. While California law allows the state attorney
general to pursue consent decree-type reform under an explicit statute, the state attorneys
general have exercised that power sparingly.135 Unlike DOJ and California, Illinois does
not have a statute granting its state attorney general explicit authority to address police
reform in a manner that resembles 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
A consent decree for Chicago was the only thing that would address the serious need
for reforms, unmet by DOJ. While private plaintiffs had lodged suits against the City for
years, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons limited
the viability of the injunctive relief sought in those suits.136 In Lyons, the plaintiff suffered
an unconstitutional chokehold in an encounter with an officer of the Los Angeles Police
Department.137 The Court held that Lyons could not seek an injunction barring the use of
the chokehold unless he could show that he was likely to suffer future injury from police
officers’ use of the chokehold.138 This decision has significantly limited private plaintiffs’
abilities to seek systemic reform in law enforcement cases.
Unfortunately, individual damages cases have proven to be ineffective at achieving
police reform. For example, in Detroit, before DOJ settled its pattern or practice case there
in 2003, Detroit had paid out over $100 million a year in police-related misconduct
damages between 1986 and 1997.139 Despite significant payouts such as these, damages
claims alone had, in many cities, been inadequate to generate deep, lasting reform.
What has been shown to work at achieving lasting police reform are consent decrees
overseen by a government entity.140 Although the empirical evidence is not comprehensive,
studies of consent decrees in other cities have shown that they are effective and
sustainable.141 In one study, completed by the Vera Institute of Justice, the authors
evaluated the impact of the Pittsburgh consent decree years after the city was no longer
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overseen by a monitor.142 The study concluded that the reforms implemented in the consent
decree remained in effect even after the decree was lifted, suggesting the reforms were
effective.143 In Los Angeles, after implementation of its consent decree, the number of
arrests increased, crime fell substantially, and the use of force decreased.144 The
community’s satisfaction with the department overall increased, although there were
material differences based on the race of the respondent.145
While we did not have an explicit statute to address police reform akin to § 14141,
the Illinois Attorney General’s Office had been part of a trend among state attorneys
general increasingly enforcing federal and state civil rights laws.146 Once Attorney General
Sessions was sworn in, it became even more imperative that state attorneys general act in
the absence of reform efforts at the federal level because it was clear that DOJ would no
longer act to protect civil rights, including in the area of police reform.
III. NEGOTIATING A CONSENT DECREE
A. Illinois Attorney General’s Office Conducts a Supplemental Investigation
In order to accomplish the enormous reform work ahead, we dedicated a team of
attorneys to conduct the factual investigation, prepared drafts of consent decree provisions,
participate in negotiations, and review and incorporate feedback from various stakeholders
into the consent decree.147 Attorneys from the law firm Robins Kaplan LLP also assisted
our office pro bono.
We hired a team of experts with extensive experience in the investigation and
oversight of large city police forces.148 Our experts included Ronald Davis, who previously
served as Executive Director of President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing149
and served as the Director of DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
(COPS Office); Kathleen O’Toole, who previously served as the Chief of the Seattle Police
Department while that Department was under a federal consent decree with the Department
of Justice; Scott Thomson, the then-current Chief of the Police Department in Camden;
New Jersey and the President of the Police Executive Research Forum, a national
organization of police executives; and Jonathan Smith, who previously served as Chief of
the Special Litigation Section of DOJ’s Civil Rights Division from 2010 to 2015, during
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which time he was responsible for eighteen pattern or practice investigations of civil rights
violations by law enforcement.150
After filing suit, we undertook a discovery process that included wide-ranging and
detailed factual investigations to further inform our understanding of CPD’s former and
current practices.151 Specifically, we propounded 242 document requests and reviewed
over 10,000 documents totaling over 97,000 pages.152 Further, in order to inform the
parties’ negotiations, we conducted interviews of officers throughout the ranks of CPD,
including commanding officers of CPD’s in-service and recruit training programs, the
commanding officer of CPD’s Force Review Unit, Training Academy staff, and field
training officers.153
During our investigation, we also observed the department-wide use of force training
provided to current CPD officers, train-the-trainer sessions, and numerous courses
provided to new recruits at CPD’s Training Academy.154 In addition, we participated in
ride-alongs in neighborhoods throughout the city, met with officers, sergeants, and watch
commanders in various CPD districts, conducted site visits, and attended several detailed
presentations provided by CPD and the City regarding ongoing and planned reform efforts
intended to address use of force, officer training, accountability, promotions, crisis
intervention, officer wellness, data management, community policing, and impartial
policing. 155
B. Community Feedback is Paramount
We knew that all our efforts would be in vain if we did not make community
engagement and feedback the central focus of our process. We built our work off of the
tireless dedication of community activists, leaders, and organizations in Chicago that had
long engaged in police reform efforts.156 Many activists had laid the foundational analysis
and outcry around the systemic problems with Chicago police for years, and it reached a
fever pitch after the Laquan McDonald shooting.157
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Approval of the Proposed Consent Decree, State of Illinois v.
City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260 at 6.
151
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While our approach to negotiating the consent decree in many ways mirrored DOJ’s
process, we prioritized the community’s voice in unique and notable ways that DOJ had
never undertaken. This collaborative approach made our process stand out from other
efforts, and it represented our office’s unyielding commitment to those most impacted by
police violence.158 Because we live here and know the strong community voices that for
too long have been ignored by traditional leadership structures, we recognized that the
complete lack of trust between the community and police was a major challenge and
restoring that trust a top priority. While asserting the critical need for the City to build that
trust, the consent decree had to be a tool for building that trust and could not serve as yet
another obstacle toward achieving it. Community engagement was key.
C. We Organize Roundtables Across the City to Gather Community Input
One way we worked to engage the community was through more than a dozen
organized, public roundtables held across Chicago. As we set out to hear from the
community members most impacted by police practices, we worked closely to organize
each meeting as an opportunity for all community members to share their stories and
experiences in interacting with CPD as well as to hear their input on what police reforms
were necessary. The Institute for Policy and Civic Engagement at the University of Illinois
at Chicago facilitated the sessions and worked with our office to design the sessions and
their format.159
At each roundtable, the community members in attendance were broken up into
round tables, where facilitators asked specific questions on three topics: impartial policing,
community policing, and use of force. The facilitator wrote down the ideas and suggestions
made at the table. Notetakers carefully transcribed and reviewed the responses by
community members to ensure they were accurately recorded.160 Eventually, all the
smaller groups came back together, and facilitators or community members reported their
ideas out to the larger group at the end of each event. In total, we hosted fourteen
roundtables throughout the city centered in some of the communities most impacted by
police misconduct and partnered with community organizations who co-hosted the
discussions in their communities and helped to spread the word to community members.161
Through the roundtable process, we received more than 6,000 comments on the
proposed consent decree from more than 1,000 participants.162 In addition, we collected
approximately 1,600 additional comments through website submissions, emails, and voice
messages.163 We shared all of the community ideas with the city.
Further, we conducted small-group conversations to ensure feedback from diverse
communities, including youth, the LGBTQ+ community, survivors of domestic violence
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and sexual assault, people experiencing homelessness, violence interrupters, and the deaf
and hard-of-hearing community.164
The University of Illinois at Chicago compiled and published a report with the
community feedback. The report also contained each of the 6,000 comments verbatim for
community review.165 Their inclusion was important to provide transparency to the
community—both to ensure community members that their comments were recorded, and
to allow them to compare them to the draft consent decree.
A thorough review of the comments and suggestions was critical to informing our
approach to the consent decree. The feedback included comments such as the following:
“There must be negative consequences for bad behavior, just like how we
raise kids. No suspensions; fire them, lock them up for violence, just like
us.”166
“Local police woman goes to play ball with kids on off hours to get to know
her. Kids know she’s police, they respect her because she care[s] about
them. Avenue for open communication, in case something happens and
needs to share that.”167
“Police don’t see communities of color as humans/ like people/ residents –
P.O.’s tend to dehumanize the people in comm[unity].”168
“Common to those concerns [called for by community members] was the
perception among residents that the majority of police on the West Side
simply do not know the residents they’re supposed to be protecting.”169
“Community members called for better training, more effective screening
of police applicants, more effective performance reviews, enhanced cultural
awareness and more accountability for police officers involved in shootings
and racial profiling incidents.”170
“Develop supports that help address stress/triggers.”171
Some suggestions included better training of police officers; not assigning inexperienced
officers at night when crime is highest; eliminating lack of trust through immediate
termination of cops who kill unarmed people; termination of officers involved in a coverup; development of police partnerships with ex-offenders; payment of police brutality
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settlements out of police pension fund; holding the sergeant accountable if a rookie cop
‘messes up’; and changing the shoot-to-kill training to preserving life.172
We brought critical community input with us into the negotiations with the City and
CPD. As a result, we introduced points into the consent decree that were novel and not
included in past DOJ consent decrees. For example, we included provisions that
specifically forbid the practice of “dumping” community members (usually teenagers) by
police officers—a practice by which CPD officers would pick up a witness from one gang
and drop them off in rival gang territory in an effort to coerce the witnesses into speaking
to the police. Other components included access to counsel within a reasonable period of
time once detained, much-needed training and selection for school resource officers,
language access, transparency and timelines regarding individual police complaints, and
more community and youth representation in community councils.
D. We Propose a Unique Agreement to Provide Community Groups with a Role in the
Consent Decree
In addition to the Campbell lawsuit, on October 4, 2017, the ACLU of Illinois and
Equip for Equality filed a lawsuit against the City on behalf of several community groups
and service organizations, including ACLU of Illinois, Communities United, Community
Renewal Society, Next Steps for Reform, and One Northside.173 The suit focused on
patterns of misconduct impacting people with disabilities, particularly mental illnesses or
developmental disabilities. One of the plaintiffs’ representatives explained why they felt
the need for a lawsuit: “[CPD does] have a history of making promises and not fulfilling
them, and so with a lawsuit, that gives you the judicial enforcement that you wouldn’t have
otherwise.”174 Citing that an estimated one-third to one-half of the people killed by police
in America have a disability, the group filed suit to address what their Plaintiffs
experienced—excessive and unnecessary force in policing. The ACLU complaint
challenged the City’s policing practices that they alleged authorized Chicago police
officers to use excessive force, to use unlawful force on black and Latino people, and to
use unnecessary force on individuals with disabilities and those in crisis.175
The ACLU’s suit, along with the Campbell plaintiffs’ suit, confirmed what many
already knew—that many facets of the Chicago community were deeply invested in the
need to implement broad reforms in Department. The City fought to dismiss both
community lawsuits, arguing among other reasons that the Campbell and Community
United plaintiffs lacked standing.
Given the legal positions the City continued to take in fighting the community
lawsuits, and the need for community members to participate in the police reform effort,
we attempted to find a position of compromise. In an innovative, first of its kind
172
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agreement, we proposed a Coalition Memorandum of Agreement (Coalition MOA)
between our office, the City, and a Coalition of community members led by the Campbell
plaintiffs and Communities United plaintiffs.176 The Coalition MOA ensured that the
community had an active voice and provided input into the substantive areas of the consent
decree while it was being drafted.177 The Coalition MOA required that the two plaintiffs
groups work together as a Coalition.178 In addition, the Coalition MOA gave the impacted
community—including people of color and people with disabilities in Chicago—an
unprecedented ability to enforce the consent decree in the future.179 Though we had been
leading the discussion to incorporate the Communities United and the Campbell Plaintiffs
into the consent decree since the fall of 2017, it took until March 2018 to reach the final
Coalition MOA. The MOA also anticipated that the consent decree would be filed by
September 1, 2018 and approved by the Court by January 1, 2019.180
“This agreement allows community groups to act as watchdogs during the long-term
reform process,” said Kathy Hunt Muse, one of the lawyers for the ACLU of Illinois.181
As part of the MOA, the Campbell and Communities United groups agreed not to file
motions to intervene or motions to consolidate their lawsuits with our litigation and agreed
to stay their suits, hoping to settle them.182
Community groups celebrated the MOA as a major step forward in their efforts to
gain oversight over CPD. Counsel for Black Lives Matter explained: “The Agreement
resulted from Black and Brown communities’ demands for justice. These communities
have secured the right to enforce the CPD consent decree and as a result, the consent decree
process now has the potential to help create meaningful community-based accountability
over CPD.”183 One of the plaintiffs, the aunt of a 16-year-old teenager killed by the police,
reacted that “after years of struggle, I finally have some hope that if the City and State
follow the Agreement, we can prevent CPD from murdering another mother’s child.”184
Never before had a police consent decree created a mechanism for ongoing community
enforcement. The MOA gave communities the ability to enforce the decree and bring
motions to enforce in court against the City for breaches of the decree, while also providing
for ongoing quarterly discussions with the community groups and the independent
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monitor.185 The community groups that were party to the MOA called it “historic and
significant.”186
E. We Conduct Focus Groups with Police Officers and Solicit Their Feedback
Another critical voice was law enforcement. Although the process involved sticking
points, we found that officers voiced their interest for many important reforms. We worked
with the Police Foundation, a national non-profit organization that conducts research and
provides technical assistance to police departments across the country. The Police
Foundation facilitated a series of focus groups among Chicago Police Department officers
in thirteen groups, eleven of which were randomly selected and facilitated by retired police
chiefs. The officers were asked to identify their greatest challenges in doing their jobs, and
to identify what the consent decree could do to address those challenges, enhance officer
safety, and enhance service to the community. The Police Foundation also established and
hosted a password-protected online comment portal that was available to all CPD officers.
The Police Foundation prepared a report that provided the parties and the public with the
results of their meetings and outreach with CPD members.187
The officers identified a lack of support from supervisors and command staff, elected
officials, and the public as the most commonly voiced concern.188 Officers also identified
the fear of negative repercussions and accountability measures, along with infrequent,
outdated, and reactionary training as additional problems.189 They suggested provisions for
inclusion in the consent decree addressing increased support for officers, mandatory
training, and improved accountability mechanisms. They expressed that the addition of
these reforms in the consent decree could improve those problems. 190 Officers identified
the critical need for more mental health counselors to support CPD members and their
families, CPD’s need to reduce the ratio of supervisors to rank and file officers, and to
establish a 1:1 ratio of Field Training Officers (FTO) to new officers (known as
probationary police officers or PPOs) that are still in training.
In addition, many officers highlighted the critical need for more mental health
counselors to support CPD members and their families.191 CPD officers have stressful jobs
that require that they place themselves in danger, and concerns about the lack of adequate
mental health resources for CPD officers had also been well documented in the DOJ
Report.192 Adequately addressing the mental health needs of officers is a particular need at
the CPD, where the officer suicide rate is 60% higher than the national law enforcement
average.193 Yet, in spite of this need, the DOJ Report found that the counselors and mental
185
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health resources at CPD was considerably less than other comparable departments and
“insufficient” to address the needs of its officers, with only three clinicians on staff.194
F. Unique Challenges Hold Up the Negotiations: The FOP’s Resistance and Concerns of
De-policing
From the beginning, the bargaining unit representing CPD’s patrol officers, the FOP,
presented a significant challenge to reform. While the investigation and recommendations
from DOJ, PATF, and our own investigation highlighted the need to increase resources for
CPD, the potential service and training, personnel, equipment, mental health and wellness
improvements for the rank and file officers did not outweigh the FOP’s perceived threat of
losing provisions in their collective bargaining agreement that made accountability for
police misconduct nearly impossible in Chicago.195
The terms and conditions of employment of CPD’s patrol officers are set out in its
collective bargaining agreement (CBA), a contract negotiated every few years between the
City and the FOP. As of the time of this writing, the most recent collective bargaining
agreement with the FOP had expired on June 30, 2017, but by its terms remains in effect
until a successor agreement is reached.196 Throughout the course of the consent decree
negotiations, the City and the FOP were in ongoing discussions regarding the terms of the
next CBA.
Whether and how the terms of the CBA and the consent decree would intersect was
a central issue in the development and approval of the consent decree. DOJ and PATF
identified several provisions of the CBA that were obstacles to reform, and community
groups demanded that a number of CBA provisions be changed.197 For example, the CBA
requires that a person complete an affidavit in support of a complaint against an officer
before that complaint would be investigated, and it forbade anonymous complaints.198 In
the past five to ten years, an estimated forty to sixty percent of misconduct investigations
had been closed because no affidavit was in the record.199 The CBA prohibited CPD from
disciplining an officer for violating the rule against making false statements unless the
officer first had an opportunity to review and amend the statement.200 The CBA requires
the destruction of police personnel records, including disciplinary files, after five years.201
The FOP viewed its chief role as protecting all of the provisions of its existing agreement
and opposing any effort that threatened those measures.
While we held several in-person meetings with the leadership of the FOP to discuss
officers’ needs and the issues in the consent decree, the FOP relentlessly criticized the
consent decree in strident terms. Calling our lawsuit “appalling,” the FOP told its members
194
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that “something is rotten in this whole plan, and it could seriously threaten our collective
bargaining rights . . . If elected officials in Chicago and the state of Illinois are going to
play politics with police departments, they are playing a dangerous game.”202
Nonetheless, our office, the FOP, and the City engaged in talks for many months.
Those discussions included not only provisions of the consent decree that would
acknowledge the CBA interests of the FOP, but also training, supervision and promotions,
mental health support services for officers, and police oversight.203
After negotiation with the FOP, the parties included “carve-out” language in the
consent decree that recognized the existing contractual rights of the union under Illinois
law. Those provisions of the consent decree provide, among other things, that “[n]othing
in this Consent Decree is intended to (a) alter any of the CBAs between the City and the
Unions; or (b) impair or conflict with the collective bargaining rights of employees in those
units under the [Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, 5 ILCS 315].”204 Every DOJ police
consent decree has contained similar “carve-out” provisions to address the legal or
contractual rights of any impacted union members.
Further, the parties offered the FOP the same terms of input and enforcement of the
consent decree as had been offered to the community groups, and they sought to enter into
a second MOA with the FOP. However, the FOP declined.205
But the FOP was outraged by the announcement that our office had reached an MOA
with community groups. FOP President Kevin Graham responded to the announcement by
saying, “the City of Chicago should be careful where they go with a consent decree.
Without the support of the rank and file Chicago Police Officers, their move today will go
nowhere. Anyone who thinks it will is sadly mistaken.”206 Second City Cop, a blog for
Chicago police officers, described the MOA as a vehicle to “give terrorists a seat at the
table.”207
On June 6, 2018 after rejecting the offer for the MOA, the FOP filed a motion to
intervene in the state lawsuit.208 The FOP stated that its decision to move to intervene in a
lawsuit that had been pending nearly a year was triggered by the community comments
made at the time the MOA was announced.209 The FOP also alleged that it did not know
that it needed to intervene until it “received information from confidential sources” that its
All Together Now, CHI. POLICE DEP’T LODGE 7 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE 5 (Sept. 2017),
http://online.flipbuilder.com/prsn/oeky/mobile/index.html#p=4.
203
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Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-06260, at 3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2018).
204
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Jan. 31, 2019), http://chicagopoliceconsentdecree.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/City_of_Chicago_lawsuit_filedcomplaint.pdf.
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2018).
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collective bargaining rights were in jeopardy.210 FOP’s legal objection to the consent
decree centered on its argument that the decree impairs its existing CBA with the City.211
The FOP, however, did not view the “carve-out” provisions in the decree as
sufficient. In early July 2018, it filed a further motion seeking to hold the proceedings in
abeyance pending a ruling on its motion to intervene.212
G. Police Mistrust and Violence Persists
In addition to the negotiations with the coalition of community groups and the FOP,
the drumbeat of misconduct allegations and intervening tragedies at CPD maintained the
high level of public interest and pressure on the consent decree process. The pressure from
several stakeholders to finalize the consent decree weighed on the negotiations. On March
27, 2018, the Chicago Tribune Editorial Board opined that “Chicagoans, too, should want
the decree buttoned up as soon as possible. Chicago cops have the difficult mission of
stopping crime and criminals. A rebuilt sense of trust from communities long alienated
from the CPD should open the flow of information from law-abiding citizens who know
who’s breaking which laws. The sooner reform enhances that relationship, the better.”213
While civil lawsuits involving police misconduct had become commonplace in
Chicago, a series of federal cases crystalized what had become a pattern of failed
accountability mechanisms. In December 2017, in the middle of closing arguments after
trial, the City paid $20 million to settle a wrongful death case filed against a CPD
detective.214 The case settled only after it was revealed that the City had failed to disclose
evidence of a past incident involving the same officer.215
That incident marked only the latest in a string of failures to produce evidence in
accordance with court orders. In the six and a half years from the beginning of Mayor
Emanuel’s term to that point, the City had been sanctioned nine times in federal court alone
for failure to comply with its legal obligations to produce evidence in police misconduct
cases, incurring over $1 million in sanctions.216
By summer of 2018, another civil trial was captivating the attention of the
Chicagoans. The wrongful death case against officer Robert Rialmo proceeded in the
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circuit court of Cook County.217 The case involved a police shooting from December 2015,
when Rialmo responded to a father’s 911 call for help with a domestic disturbance when
his son was having a mental health crisis.218 Rialmo saw the son, 19-year-old Quintonio
LeGrier, ten feet or more away from him with a baseball bat.219 Rialmo shot and killed
LeGrier and also accidentally killed LeGrier’s downstairs neighbor and bystander, 55-yearold Bettie Jones.220 The trial turned on whether LeGrier swung the bat at Rialmo and how
far LeGrier was from Rialmo when he fired.221 At the conclusion of the trial, jurors voted
to award the family over $1 million and also ruled that the officer reasonably believed he
had to fire to protect himself.222 The judge negated the verdict.223 Afterward, COPA
recommended terminating Rialmo’s employment with CPD, but Superintendent Johnson
disagreed, leaving the decision to the Chicago Police Board, which unanimously voted to
terminate Rialmo.224 In September 2018, the City Council voted to settle the case brought
by Bettie Jones’s family for $16 million.225
At the same time, the general public maintained a constant focus on the continued
drumbeat of violent crime statistics.226 While homicides in 2018 occurred at a lower level
than the record-breaking years of 2016 and 2017, they still outpaced the levels of 2014 and
2015.227 The public increasingly recognized the broken relationship between the police and
the community as a barrier to reducing violence.228 This recognition created pressure to
finalize the consent decree and institute reforms to improve community relations. For
217
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example, the Chicago Tribune Editorial Board recognized the potential consent decree as
a tool to both build community trust and reduce crime. “Negotiations between Emanuel
and state Attorney General Lisa Madigan on a consent decree to monitor police reforms
could help reimagine the relationship [between minority neighborhoods and the CPD].
When community members distrust cops on the beat, criminals take advantage.”229
In the midst of this turmoil, in May 2018, the FOP organized a protest at a City
Council meeting to object to the City’s actions and complain that the Mayor had “turned
his back on the police.”230 In a flyer encouraging officers to attend the council meeting in
protest, the union asserted that “Emanuel is selling officers out in a federal consent decree
that would give anti-police groups a voice in police oversight.”231
Local media perceived the Mayor as “caught between police reform advocates
demanding a strong consent decree with rigid mandates and timetables and the need to
coax police officers out of their defensive crouch to combat violent crime.”232 As a result,
the Mayor announced that, with respect to his approach to the consent decree, he is “playing
it down the middle of the fairway.”233
H. We Hit an Impasse on Recordation of Pointing a Firearm
In a public status appearance in federal court on July 20, 2018, we announced that
we had largely reached agreement with the City on the terms of the consent decree, but that
the parties had an outstanding dispute on a single issue: whether or not CPD officers should
be required to record each time a firearm is pointed at a person.234 We maintained these
incidents needed to be reported, which CPD policy did not require.235
Our office pursued this requirement, a common one in recent DOJ-negotiated
consent decrees, in light of one of DOJ’s central findings: the manner in which CPD
officers handled their firearms was intricately connected to the use of unreasonable
force.236 CPD did not require officers to document when they display or point a firearm in
229
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the course of conducting an investigatory stop or arrest. By contrast, the New York Police
Department requires officers to document investigatory stops on a form that includes a
specific box in which officers are to mark “Drawing/ Pointing Firearm” if it is one of the
“Actions Taken to Stop and/or Detain.”237 Other cities with variations of this reporting
requirement include Detroit, Dallas, Oakland, and Washington, D.C.238
The community plaintiffs were swift to decry the impasse. “If this is the issue that
they’re stuck on, I’m frankly shocked,” said Karen Sheley, an attorney of the ACLU of
Illinois.239 Craig Futterman, a clinical law professor at the University of Chicago Law
School and counsel for the Campbell plaintiffs, said “I’m surprised that that’s a point of
any serious contention. It’s been accepted in other consent decrees. For a department
engaged in a pattern of excessive force and committed to redressing it, it seems to me an
obvious proposition, as opposed to something that would invite controversy.”240
I. We Release a Draft Consent Decree While Negotiations Continue
On July 27, 2018, we released a draft consent decree, without resolving the pointing
of a firearm issue. Along with the Mayor and police superintendent, our office appeared at
a “jam-packed, hour-long news conference in the Thompson Center” to announce the
release of a voluminous draft for public comment.241
We recognized the historic effort by commenting that, while many previous attempts
at police reform have not brought the systemic and sustainable change that is required, and,
speaking as Attorney General, Lisa Madigan announced that “it will be different this time.”
She added, “[u]nlike those in the past, attempts to just talk the talk and not walk the walk
Baltimore Consent Decree (2017) at ¶¶ 140, 169, United States v. Baltimore Police Dep’t et. al, 282 F.
Supp. 3d 897 (D. Md. 2017) (No.17-99) (hereinafter Baltimore Consent Decree); Consent Decree at 67(j),
73, 76, United States v. City of Newark, (D.N.J. 2017) (No. 16-1731) (hereinafter Newark Consent
Decree); Consent Decree at 173, 183, 187, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv000180 (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 19, 2016).; Settlement Agreement at 56, 94, United States v. City of Cleveland, No 1:15CV1046
(N.D. Ohio June 12, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/908536/download;
Consent Decree at ¶¶ 14, 42, United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-CV-1025 (D.N.M. Nov. 14,
2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/12/19/apd_settlement_11-14-14.pdf;
New Orleans Police Department at 76,83, United States v. City of New Orleans, 35 F. Supp. 3d 788 (E.D.
La. 2013) (No. 12-1924); Settlement Agreement at 63, 69, United States v. City of Portland, No. 12-CV02265, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188465 (D. Or. Feb. 19, 2013),
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will be unsuccessful.”242 The parties announced that, in an unprecedented process of
transparency and community engagement, the public would have twenty-one days to
review and provide comments on the draft consent decree, and the parties would then
review the public input and return to the negotiating table to revise the consent decree.243
The Attorney General’s Office established a website and hotline through which members
of the public could provide any reactions to the draft decree.244 The Editorial Board of the
Chicago Sun-Times called on the public to review the draft and provide comments.245
While the public welcomed the opportunity to review the consent decree prior to
court filing, the disagreement between the parties on a requirement to report the pointing
of a firearm dominated public discussion. When asked about the issue at the press
conference, the disagreement between the parties was plain. In an effort to explain the
City’s reluctance to agree to the requirement, Mayor Emanuel asserted that the requirement
of recording the pointing of a firearm was not a key issue identified in the DOJ or PATF
reports, even though the DOJ report explicitly highlighted this problem.246 The
Superintendent explained that he did not want to put officers in a position in which they
would hesitate to draw their weapons, and he did not want it to be a deterrent to good
policing.247 Illinois Attorney General Madigan asserted that the pointing of a firearm ought
to be tracked because other consent decrees carry such a provision, and pointing a gun
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. She also made clear we would litigate
this issue if needed.248 Our expert, Ron Davis, explained, “[i]t is better to know the truth
[of how often and when officers are pointing their firearms at members of the public] than
to operate in a vacuum and just assume everything is fine. That is not OK in 2018.”249
The editorial boards of both major Chicago newspapers took up the issue and argued
that gun pointing should be documented. The day the consent decree was announced, the
Sun-Times Editorial Board released an editorial entitled, “Every time a cop pulls a gun, it
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should be documented.”250 It challenged: “City Hall ought to get fully on board.”251 The
Chicago Tribune Editorial Board also stated that with respect to a gun being pointed,
“simply pointing a gun is a use of force. It’s deadly serious.”252 Of the fact that
Superintendent Johnson does not know how often his officers point a gun at someone, the
Chicago Tribune declared, “officers deserve clarity. They aren’t going to get it from a
department that doesn’t know when or why they are pointing their guns.”253 Such practices
erode the community’s trust in the police and traumatize individuals and their families who
have had guns pointed at them.
While the negotiations about the pointing requirement continued, a new lawsuit
arose. A father living on the city’s southwest side sued the City, asserting that two officers
pointed their guns at his two young children after they burst through the front door while
executing a search warrant at the wrong address.254 In response to a separate incident,
weeks earlier the City Council had approved a $2.5 million dollar settlement in an
excessive-force lawsuit that accused police of pointing a gun at the chest of a 3-year-old
and striking her handcuffed mother.255 Their lawyer explained, “[i]t’s been so normalized
by Chicago policing over the decades, and it happens with such regularity, that many of
the citizens on the South and West sides that I talk to do not even know that it’s illegal
policing to point a gun at a child for no reason.”256
Still unable to reach an agreement on the issue, on August 29, 2018, we moved for
permission from the Court to take the issue to trial. We asked for “focused litigation on a
single, limited issue”257 because the negotiations had not resulted in an agreement. No DOJ
pattern or practice case regarding police misconduct had ever gone to trial,258 but the
parties prepared to do just that as litigation got underway.
After weeks of contentious meetings and dozens of proposals and counter proposals,
on September 6, 2018, we announced an agreement to resolve the pointing issue with the
City.259 We agreed that any time an officer points a gun at a person during an arrest or
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street stop, they will call in to dispatchers by radio to inform them of the incident. The
officer’s supervisor will be notified and must review each incident and associated body
camera footage to ensure the officer followed CPD policy and that any misconduct is
addressed.
The agreement also requires CPD headquarters to review and audit all incidents
involving an officer pointing a firearm at a person to, among other things, identify any
patterns of misconduct and any need for tactical training. In addition, CPD will provide
officers with instruction on weapons discipline and when officers should and should not
point a firearm at a person. CPD also agreed to clarify in its policy that officers will only
point a firearm at a person when it is objectively reasonable to do so.
Reaching agreement on the requirement to record when officers point their firearms
allowed the parties to finalize their changes to the consent decree based on the public
comment period feedback.
IV. REVISING THE CONSENT DECREE
A. The Public Weighs In
After the parties published the draft consent decree, they invited additional comments
until August 17, 2018. As a result of the process, the parties received approximately 1,700
additional comments and suggestions on the range of topics included in the consent decree,
and many that were not.260
The Coalition, largely composed of the Campbell and Community United plaintiffs,
gave a presentation and told their experiences and truths to the parties. The Coalition shared
input as to what they felt needed to be in the consent decree to both our Office and
representatives from the City, including the Corporation Counsel, First Deputy Corporation
Counsel, CPD leadership and the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety.
Ultimately, the parties re-negotiated and changed several dozen provisions of the
consent decree based on public input.
Some of the most significant changes related to the publication of data on police
practices, increased transparency, and additional requirements that CPD consider
community input as it creates policy. For example, the consent decree requires that CPD
publish the source data for its annual assessment of policing practices and break out the
data by race and gender.261 Based on multiple complaints of excessive force used by police
officers against students in schools, the parties included policies related to CPD officers in
Chicago Public Schools. The consent decree requires that CPD seek out and consider the
input of students, parents, and community stakeholders in developing those policies.262
In another significant area of improvement, the parties ensured additional protections
and resources for people with disabilities. Specifically, the revised consent decree requires
that CPD use qualified interpreters to communicate with people who are deaf or hard of
convicted of one count of second-degree murder and 16 counts of aggravated battery but acquitted of
official misconduct. Id.
260
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hearing, train officers to recognize and respond to conduct related to an individual’s
disability, and designate an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) liaison to coordinate
its compliance with the ADA.263 The changes also require the inclusion of individuals who
have personally experienced a behavioral or mental health crisis in the City’s crisis
intervention response advisory committee, and that CPD perform additional recordkeeping
of service to people with disabilities.264 On September 13, 2018, the parties filed the revised
consent decree with the Court, seeking the approval of Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr., the judge
assigned to the case, and asking the Court to enter the decree as a final court order.
Given the intense public interest in the consent decree, on September 19, 2018, the
Court encouraged members of the public who wanted to comment on the Court’s
consideration of the proposed consent decree to do so in writing.265 In response to Judge
Dow’s order providing for the opportunity to comment, over 500 public comments were
filed, 266 more than three times the number that had been filed in any DOJ police reform
consent decree.267
Members of the Coalition filed extensive written comments with the Court, asking it
to adopt provisions of an alternative Chicago Community Consent Decree, which had been
drafted by community groups and included their recommendations.268 While the Coalition
recognized and acknowledged that many of their provisions had been adopted by the parties
in the consent decree, they posited that the “historic potential will only be fully realized if
the final consent decree contains the provisions outlined here, which are deemed essential
by Chicago’s communities most affected by police violence and misconduct.”269
In addition to receiving written comments, Judge Dow also held extensive fairness
hearings over two days, on October 24-25, 2018, to provide the public an opportunity to
comment on the proposed consent decree in person. Because of the significant demand to
participate in the hearings, speakers were limited to five minutes, and the Court
administered a lottery to determine who would be permitted to speak and in what order.270
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The fairness hearings gave community members an important public forum to share
with the federal judge their experiences with CPD. Ninety-six individuals addressed the
court during the two-day public hearings.271 The hearings took place in the Dirksen Federal
Building’s ceremonial courtroom, the largest courtroom space available in the Chicago
courthouse, with an overflow courtroom to accommodate additional observers.
For two days, the Court heard from community members, organizers, representatives
of religious communities, attorneys, and police officers. Many members of the community
spoke of their own experiences with the CPD and supported the consent decree as a vehicle
to address the problems they had personally experienced. Angelica Nieves described how
an off-duty officer killed her brother after that officer had stalked, harassed, and threatened
him.272 Her brother had called 911 to report the officer several times prior to the incident.273
According to Ms. Nieves, the officer had twenty citations, a prior suspension, and orders
of protection in place prior to the incident. 274 “My family chain is broken. My only brother
was taken, my parents’ only son was taken, and my children’s only uncle was taken from
us.”275
The Court heard stories of youth who were so frequently touched during CPD
searches that they routinely put their hands up to be cuffed to a chain link fence without
being asked to do so;276 of a sixty-year-old Latino man who felt embarrassed when his
neighbors saw police hold him up against a car;277 of a mother who was not allowed to see
her 19-year-old son after he was shot by officers;278 of a fifteen-year-old and her friends
who were handcuffed to a chain fence;279 of a developmentally disabled man knocked
down and handcuffed;280 of a man who was apprehended and whose home was searched
based on the false identification of a witness;281 of a woman who reported that she had
been raped by an officer but had not been contacted by anyone from the City investigating
her claim;282 and of a college student who was grabbed, tackled to the ground, beaten, and
thrown into a police wagon while he was participating in a protest.283 One senior citizen
told a story of having an officer stick a gun under the hood hair dryer she was sitting under
when her hairdresser’s home was raided by the police.284
Two pastors—one African American, one white—told personal stories from their
lives and congregations about interactions with the police. An African American pastor
271

Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260, 2019 WL 398703, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 2019).
Transcript of Proceedings—Fairness Hearing Before the Honorable Robert M. Dow, Jr., October 25,
2018, at Volume 2-A 190:16-191:22, Illinois v. City of Chicago, 2019 WL 398703 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (on file
with authors).
273
Id.
274
Id. at Volume 2-A 191:099-14.
275
Id.
276
Id. at Volume 1-A 46:17-22.
277
Id. at Volume 1-A 82:0 9-13.
278
Id. at Volume 2-A 192: 099-193:24.
279
Id. at Volume 1-B 108: 18-109:01.
280
Id. at Volume 1-B 112: 033-10.
281
Id. at Volume 1-B 114:066-115:16.
282
Id. at Volume 2-A 205: 055-16.
283
Id. at Volume 2-A 215:16-216:2.
284
Testimony of Michael Garza, Transcript of Proceedings—Fairness Hearing Before the Honorable
Robert M. Dow, Jr., October 24, 2018 at Volume 1-B at 177:15-23, Illinois v. City of Chicago, 2019 WL
398703 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (on file with authors).
272

158

Vol. 15:2]

Lisa Madigan, Cara Hendrickson and Karyn L. Bass Ehler

told of being detained, questioned, and having his home searched when the alarm system
in his new home sounded. “Absent my collar and my suit, I and my son, and even my
daughter, become potentially targets.”285 A white pastor from a congregation in a
predominately white area of the city explained that their church has budgeted to pay for an
Uber to transport one of their African-American elders who has been stopped by police
repeatedly on his commute to church via public transportation.286
Many community members urged the Court to make additions to the consent decree.
The Coalition submitted nearly 100 pages of written comments to the Court based largely
on the Chicago Community Consent Decree. While they were supportive of the consent
decree, they asked the court not to miss the opportunity to do more.287 As one of them
explained, “[t]he reason we are here today and saying that a consent decree is necessary, it
is our course of last resort.”288
More than a half-dozen current and former CPD patrol officers also testified. They
uniformly opposed the consent decree. Nearly all of the patrol officers who testified
identified an affiliation with the FOP. The President of the FOP, Kevin Graham, testified
that he had spoken to U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who he reported was “against
this consent decree.”289 Officers commonly expressed the concern that the consent decree
would “tie the hands of police officers,”290 and they disagreed that additional oversight of
the Department was needed. One officer testified:
The people of this city don’t need this decree or any more oversight of the
police. There are more levels of oversight than there are days in the week.
What they need are members of the police department who feel that they’re
being treated fairly and justly by their employers, by the media, and by those
organizations that exist sometimes to create purpose for themselves.291
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They also argued that the parties overlooked the significance of violent crime, which
they asserted was the problem. Financial Secretary of the FOP Michael Garza said, “Police
didn’t make this environment. The criminals made this environment.”292
While several speakers noted the substantial disconnect between the community and
the officers at the hearing, one community member summarized the problem: “when we
have mothers who feel like they can’t tell their children to call the police, to trust the police,
to look to them to solve a dangerous situation, you can’t possibly protect the
community.”293
B. The Calls for Reform Continue
Even while the consent decree was under consideration by the Court, the calls for
action did not end. Community members and activists, including the Shriver Center on
Poverty Law, urged the City to act on some issues even in advance of finalization of the
consent decree.294 The City’s Inspector General Office issued a report on school resource
officers, criticizing the CPD for not having clear directives for how it selects, trains, and
evaluates school resource officers.295 The Inspector General reported that neither the police
department nor the school district has a set agreement with written rules, roles or
responsibilities for the school officers, instead relying on a police department general order
over thirty years old, dating from 1988.296 The consent decree also addressed this very
concern with school resource officers. In response to the Inspector General’s report, there
was a public call to take action. The Chicago Sun-Times Editorial Board asserted that
“some things can’t wait,” urging CPD to improve standards for school resource officers
without further delay.297 A 2017 report by the Shriver Center on Poverty Law, Handcuffs
in Hallways, noted that the City had paid more than $2 million between 2012 and 2016 to
settle legal complaints against CPD officers assigned to schools.298
In addition, the Department continued to be plagued by tragedy and mental health
crises as three officers committed suicide on police department grounds or while on duty
in August and September 2018 alone.299 The number of counselors available for CPD
officers was historically low and continued to be during this time, as the DOJ report
292
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highlighted. Changes to staffing levels for mental health resources available to CPD
officers was a key component of the consent decree, which required the City to increase
the number of counselors available to ten.300
Adding to the tension in the city, in September 2018, officer Jason Van Dyke went
on trial for the murder of Laquan McDonald. He was convicted of second-degree murder
and sixteen counts of aggravated battery. “Throughout Chicago’s neighborhoods, L trains
and offices, just before 2 p.m. Friday, as the verdict came down, the city stood,
transfixed.”301 However, though the verdict felt like a vindication for many community
members—that for the first time in the city’s history, a police officer would be held
criminally responsible for killing a young, Black man, the sentence eventually handed
down by the Judge in January 2019 was only six and a half years and would likely result
in Van Dyke serving only three years in prison.302 The community’s outrage was
palpable.303
V. APPROVAL BY THE COURT
A. DOJ and FOP Take One Last Crack at Undermining the Consent Decree
In late August, the Court denied the FOP’s motion to intervene in the litigation,
finding that the motion, filed more than nine months after the complaint, was not timely.304
The Court described in detail the outreach efforts of the parties, including to the FOP, and
found that the union must have known about its interests in the suit when the case was
filed.305 The Court agreed that, in light of the late stage of the negotiations and the
completion of a voluminous draft consent decree, the parties would be prejudiced by the
late intervention of a new party.306
The parties’ efforts to seek input from the FOP and officers demonstrated to the Court
that to “the extent the FOP’s interests have not been fully vetted in the drafting of the
consent decree to date, that deficiency is at least in part a self-inflicted wound. Allowing
intervention now would undoubtedly delay the proceedings to the detriment of the original
parties’ interests.”307
The Court recognized that FOP has a significant interest in the consent decree, as its
members will be working under its terms for years to come.308 However, the Court relied
on the “carve-out” language negotiated by the parties, reasoning that the language required
300
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the City to make any changes to the CBAs at the bargaining table, rather than in the consent
decree, and adequately protected the ability of the FOP to raise any provisions they
perceive to be conflicts with the CBA at the time the court reviews and considers the
consent decree for approval.309 The FOP then appealed the Court’s ruling to the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
Even without party status, the union provided extensive briefing and written
comments to the consent decree. The union filed a fifty-four-page brief opposing the
consent decree and asserting that dozens of provisions violated the CBA or state law.310 In
its comments, the FOP objected to nearly eighty separate reforms included in the consent
decree, arguing that they violated a variety of laws, their CBA, and that they would
jeopardize officer safety.311
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court on January 2, 2019.312
In denying the FOP’s motion to intervene, the Seventh Circuit held that these provisions
made clear that the parties “do not intend for the consent decree to be interpreted as
impairing CBA rights.”313 Notably, the Seventh Circuit found the FOP’s decision to wait
nearly nine months to file its motion fatal, citing the FOP’s own repeated public comments
about the consent decree as evidence that it was aware of the intersection between the
consent decree and its CBA.314 Informal discussions throughout the second half of 2017
and into 2018 also indicated that the FOP was aware of ongoing negotiations between the
parties and had ample opportunity to file a motion to intervene earlier.315
The Court held that “[i]f the parties interpret the consent decree in a way which
violates CBA rights, the [FOP] can avail itself of normal remedies for CBA violations.”316
“As things stand now, the consent decree cannot impair the CBA or state law rights enjoyed
by Chicago police officers. That will change only if the district court concludes that federal
law requires the abrogation of those rights.”317
The FOP, however, felt they had additional support from the Trump Administration
as they tried to stop the consent decree. On September 18, 2018, Attorney General Sessions
traveled to the northern suburbs of Chicago to deliver a speech at a police convention,
blaming Chicago’s homicide rate on the cessation of stop-and-frisk practices.318 Attorney
General Sessions remarked, “[t]here’s a clear lesson here: if you want more shootings and
more death, then listen to the ACLU, Black Lives Matter, or Antifa. If you want public
safety, then listen to the police professionals who have been studying this for 35 years.”319
Similarly, on the Monday following the conviction of Jason Van Dyke, President
Trump announced that he would send Sessions to “go to the great city of Chicago to help
309
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straighten out the terrible shooting wave,” commenting on the “horrible deal” that the City
had entered into with the ACLU to reduce the use of stop-and-frisk.320 The next day,
Sessions announced that DOJ would oppose the consent decree by filing a statement of
interest with the federal court, despite Sessions’ 2017 memo designating police reform and
consent decrees to state and local authorities, not the DOJ.321 The FOP issued a statement
approving of DOJ’s position: “we are exceedingly grateful that President Trump and AG
Sessions are opposing this consent decree.”322
The following week, Attorney General Sessions traveled to Chicago to address the
Chicago Crime Commission, referring to the consent decree as “an insult” to the
Department and that “the proposed consent decree would transfer control to two retiring
politicians and a federal judge.”323
In the statement of interest DOJ filed with the Court, DOJ opposed entry of the
consent decree, asserting that the Court should instead “allow state and local officials—
and Chicago’s brave front-line police officers—to engage in flexible and localized efforts
to advance the goal of safe, effective, and constitutional policing in Chicago.”324 In its
blind efforts to stop the consent decree that was, in part, the product of its own
investigation, DOJ ignored the fact that the consent decree was the result of negotiations
between state and local officials, including police officers, that DOJ purported to endorse
in its statement of interest.
B. The District Court Approves the Consent Decree
On January 31, 2019, a few weeks after the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of
the FOP’s motion to intervene, the district court entered an order approving the consent
decree in its original proposed form.325 The Court acknowledged its review of the many
comments submitted to the Court suggesting changes to the contents of the decree, but the
court ultimately declined these requests, noting the extensive role of public input in the
development and revision of the proposed consent decree before it was filed for court
approval. 326 As Judge Dow wrote, “[t]he final decree that the court approves today thus
represents the culmination of an enormous undertaking by the parties and the thousands of
others who have participated in the wide range of opportunities for community input.”327
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In response to the FOP’s numerous concerns about areas of potential conflict
between their CBA and the consent decree, the district court found the union’s rights
remain adequately protected by the “carve-out” language in the consent decree.328 The
Court held that the consent decree cannot alter the existing CBA without the union’s assent,
and that the “carve-out” language in the consent decree adequately protects existing CBA
provisions and rights under state law. 329
While the Court did not analyze or resolve each of the FOP’s assertions of conflict
with the CBA, it did emphasize that many of the reforms addressed in the consent decree
will need to be determined during CBA negotiations between the City and the unions, who
will “bargain in the shadow of all applicable law.”330 The Court pointedly observed that a
desire to terminate a consent decree and end court oversight is a strong incentive to reach
agreement on CBA-related matters, citing two consent decrees in which City agencies had
been subject to federal court oversight for nearly fifty years.331
C. The Selection of an Independent Monitor and Special Master
At the same time the Court was considering the proposed consent decree, the parties
were negotiating the selection of the independent monitor. On October 18, 2018, the parties
announced that they had narrowed the field to four finalist teams, including two teams from
the Chicago area, and two from Washington, D.C. and New York. The parties hosted two
public forums to seek public input, held in the basement of the State of Illinois building.
The parties also created an Engaged Stakeholder Committee made up of individuals and
organizations engaged in advocacy on policing matters in Chicago. The committee
interviewed and provided input to the parties on the four independent monitor finalists.
On March 1, 2019, the court appointed Maggie Hickey and her team as independent
monitor.332 In his order appointing Hickey as independent monitor, Judge Dow also
appointed retired U.S. District Judge David H. Coar to serve as a special master assisting
the Court. “[T]he Master will be a facilitator and problem-solver on specific tasks that fall
outside the areas which the Monitor is best suited to handle.”333 The Court explained:
The parties and the court have concluded that, in view of the complexity of
this case, a Master as authorized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be appointed to perform certain tasks that fall outside the scope of
the Monitor’s duties or would involve more time intensive involvement than
either the Monitor or the Court can devote to the issue. Under the terms of
the decree, the Monitor is tasked with an enormous array of duties across
an almost staggering array of topics.334
Under the consent decree, the monitor must conduct surveys of a broad cross-section
of the Chicago community within 180 days and every two years thereafter.335 The monitor
328
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will prepare annual monitoring plans that include a schedule for compliance reviews and
audits and the methodology for such reviews.336 The monitor will publish semi-annual
reports on compliance and a comprehensive assessment after three years.337 The monitor
is also required to hold public meetings and meet with Coalition representatives, CPD
officers, and the collective bargaining representatives of the CPD.338 All policies will be
submitted to the monitor and the Illinois Attorney General’s Office for review, comment,
and, if necessary, objection.339 The consent decree requires that CPD’s plans for reform
must be approved by the monitor prior to implementation by the Department.340
The monitor will conduct a comprehensive assessment of the department after three
years to determine whether and to what extent the City and CPD are in compliance with
the decree. After that assessment, the court will determine whether to renew the monitor’s
appointment.
Recognizing the cost of the independent monitor’s annual $2.85 million budget, the
Court acknowledged that, while it is a “large expenditure of money by any measure,” in
context, if a monitoring team had been in place since the inception of Chicago and billed
the City at the rate of “$2.85 million per year since 1790, when Jean Baptiste Point du
Sable first set up camp at the mouth of the Chicago River, the total bill of $652.65 million
would not equal the City’s litigation-related payouts in civil rights actions since 2004.”341
VI. THE CPD CONSENT DECREE IS A NATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR POLICE REFORM
We knew taking on Chicago police reform would be difficult work, but we believe
we have created a template for other states and cities to replicate, and we are optimistic
that the tireless commitment by our entire team to the process of police reform will result
in transformation for all residents of the City of Chicago.
The consent decree calls for substantial and wide-reaching reform of CPD’s policies,
practices, training, and accountability mechanisms.342 Its goal is to ensure that CPD
delivers services in a manner that (1) fully complies with the Constitution and federal and
state laws; (2) respects the rights of the people of Chicago; (3) builds trust between officers
and the communities they serve; and (4) promotes community and officer safety.343
Many of the provisions included in the consent decree echo similar provisions in
consent decrees in other jurisdictions after DOJ investigated and recommended comparable
remedies for unconstitutional conduct by police. In drafting the decree, we drew from
reforms instituted in other cities as a result of DOJ agreements, as these reflect professional
standards to which all police departments should subscribe. Other aspects of the consent
decree break new ground, such as provisions providing transparency by requiring CPD to
publish data regarding use of force incidents and provisions significantly expanding the
support services provided to CPD officers. To ensure that the reforms become ingrained in
CPD principles and structure, the standard for compliance in the consent decree requires
336
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that CPD incorporates each substantive provision into policy, adequately trains on the
policy, and carries out the policy requirement in actual practice.344
The consent decree addresses a broad range of topics, including impartial policing,
community policing, crisis intervention, use of force; recruitment, hiring, and promotion;
training; supervision; officer wellness and support; accountability and transparency; and
data collection, analysis, and management.
A. Impartial Policing
Both DOJ and PATF concluded that CPD’s pattern of unconstitutional policing and
use of force disproportionately impacted people of color.345 “These enforcement actions
have deepened a widespread perception that police are indiscriminately targeting anyone
and everyone in communities of color without making individualized determinations of
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.”346 This widespread belief was echoed by the
President of the Cook County Board, Toni Preckwinkle, who remarked to the press: “I
always believed that the police could shoot black and brown people with impunity. And
I’m the president of the county, and I believe that. So, what do people on the street believe?
Probably the same as me.”347
The consent decree requires CPD to conduct impartial policing training for all
officers annually.348 The decree requires training for officers on hate crimes and a revision
of those policies.349 The Department will require officers to immediately report to a
supervisor all incidents where they observe other CPD officers engaging in misconduct,
including discrimination or profiling.350 The decree also seeks to improve CPD interactions
with diverse communities through policies and training on providing services to members
of religious communities, LGBTQ+ individuals, children and youth, and individuals with
limited English proficiency.351 The decree includes the provision of reasonable
accommodations, ensuring effective communication, and designating an ADA liaison.352
Significantly, the consent decree requires CPD to assess its patterns of misdemeanor arrests
and citations by race and gender and address disparities.353 Journalists reported that the
City handed out more tickets for minor offenses—including riding a bicycle on the
sidewalk and failure to shovel snow— in parts of the city with some of the highest
concentrations of African-American residents.354 The assessment of CPD’s practices
344
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promotes accountability and transparency through an annual review and assessment of
misdemeanor arrests and citations for race and gender-based disparate impact and the
publication of the underlying data.355 In addition, the consent decree requires CPD to
develop a new policy that prohibits sexual misconduct by CPD officers.356
B. Community Policing
Community policing principles include trust and legitimacy, community
engagement, community partnerships, problem-solving, and collaboration.357 The CPD’s
Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) program, which had once been considered
a national model, had by 2016 become a decentralized, neglected, and underfunded
program, receiving only about 0.3% of CPD’s budget—less than one-third of its allocation
in 1999.358 As Chicago’s community policing program withered, the national consensus
on the benefits of community policing grew. For example, in May 2015, the President’s
Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended that “law enforcement agencies should
develop and adopt policies and strategies that reinforce the importance of community
engagement in managing public safety.”359
Throughout the agreement, the consent decree requires CPD to integrate community
policing principles throughout CPD’s operations.360 For example, the consent decree
requires the Department to put in place criteria for selecting and evaluating school
resources officers.361 Prior to the consent decree, neither Chicago Public Schools nor CPD
had policies defining the role of CPD officers stationed in public schools, nor did CPD
have any specialized training for officers assigned to schools despite reports documenting
systemic problems with the conduct of those officers.362 The decree also promotes positive
interactions with youth through revised policies and trainings, regular meetings to seek
input from a diverse cross-section of Chicago youth, community partnerships, and the
exercise of discretion to use alternatives to arrest or referral to juvenile court.363
C. Crisis Intervention
The consent decree aims at promoting the use of crisis intervention techniques in
order to reduce the need to use force, to facilitate access to the healthcare system rather
than the criminal justice system, and to decrease unnecessary criminal justice
involvement.364 The decree requires CPD to begin providing all officers with regular crisis
355
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intervention training.365 Certified crisis intervention officers will receive additional
ongoing training, and CPD must develop a plan to ensure that a sufficient number of CIT
officers can respond to calls for service involving individuals in crisis.366 The agreement
also requires initial and refresher mental health and awareness training for 911 operators
so they can better spot and triage crisis calls.367
D. Use of Force
Use of force was a critical issue, and an area that DOJ and PATF had identified a
need for significant training and reform. The consent decree requires officers to use deescalation techniques in potential and ongoing use of force incidents, including using time
as a tactic to slow down the pace of an incident, creating distance between the officer and
the potential threat, requesting assistance from other officers or specialized units, and using
trauma-informed techniques, including acknowledging confusion or mistrust.368 Officers
are prohibited from using deadly force against a person who is only a threat to herself or
himself or to property.369 Officers are prohibited from firing at moving vehicles, except in
extreme circumstances as a last resort to preserve human life or prevent great bodily
harm.370 In addition, an individual fleeing a scene, without any other basis for suspicion,
does not justify use of a Taser.371 CPD must train and equip officers to provide life-saving
aid and require officers to provide such aid following officer use of force incidents and
prior to the arrival of emergency services.372 The consent decree requires monthly
publication of use of force data and requires supervisory review of use of force incidents
and referral of instances that may violate the law or CPD policy to COPA.373
At least as important as clarifying and strengthening CPD’s rules about use of force
is the unprecedented reporting and oversight when force is used, to ensure accountability
for both individual officers and CPD. The consent decree broadened the categories of uses
of force that must be reported to include the use of any force by a CPD officer to overcome
the active resistance of a subject.374 The decree also requires supervisors to review all uses
of force, with more serious uses of force requiring a supervisor to come to the scene and
take statements from witnesses.375
E. Recruitment, Hiring, and Promotion
The community provided significant feedback about hiring and tremendous input
from officers about the promotions’ process. Officers are deeply skeptical about the
fairness of the current system of promotions. The consent decree requires that CPD have
clear guidance on its policies and procedures for recruiting, hiring, and promoting officers.
365
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The decree mandates that CPD conduct an assessment of recruitment and hiring efforts
every three years that specifically considers, among other things, methods for addressing
discriminatory and biased hiring practices. Prior to December 2019, promotions in CPD
occurred either through testing or through a merit promotion system, which relied on
internal nominations from CPD command staff376 and some aspects of an officer’s
background, including disciplinary history, were not determinative or might not even be
considered. Under the consent decree, CPD must obtain independent expert assessments
of its promotions process to ensure lawfulness and transparency.377 Also, under the consent
decree, CPD must account for discipline of officers before promoting them.378
F. Training
In response to the Laquan McDonald video being released, CPD instituted, for the
first time in its history, a mandatory in-service training program on use of force for officers.
Superintendent Johnson has remarked that, before 2017, the last time he received use of
force training was more than three decades ago at the police academy.379 The consent
decree requires that the annual training will be informed by a needs assessment, which will
take into account patterns observed by CPD, as well as the input from the community, and
that, by 2021, officers will receive forty hours of in-service training annually.380
Importantly, the consent decree strengthens the rigor of the training for new officers,
by requiring the Police Academy to incorporate adult learning principles and experiential,
hands-on training—not just classroom lectures. In addition, the decree requires that
probationary police officers—officers that have graduated from the Academy and have
taken an additional nine months of hands-on learning in a police district beat with a Field
Training Officer—will be assigned a field training officer with a 1:1 ratio.381 This
additional requirement marks significant change from past trends in CPD, which had in
some cases had three probationary police officers to a single Field Training Officer.382
G. Supervision
Currently, CPD officers do not have one regular supervisor. Instead, they may be
under the command of a different supervisor on each shift, and that sergeant could have as
many as 20 officers under his or her command during a shift. A lack of consistent,
accountable supervision contributes to many of the accountability failures in CPD. For
years, CPD had failed to meet the best practice standard of a 1:10 ratio of supervisor to
376
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officers. The consent decree requires that CPD design and implement a staffing model that
will require officers have a regular supervisor, and that supervisors not be responsible for
more than ten officers at a time.383 The decree also requires annual performance
evaluations be conducted by supervisors who have directly supervised an officer.384
H. Officer Wellness and Support
Addressing the CPD suicide rate and the need for mental health services for law
enforcement officers was a priority for the consent decree. The consent decree aims to put
in place adequate support systems to treat mental health, substance abuse, emotional
challenges, and other job-related stressors in order to achieve a healthy, effective,
constitutionally compliant police force. The decree requires an immediate increase in the
number of licensed mental health professional staff available to CPD members and ensures
that they have reasonable access to counseling. The decree provides for the development
and implementation of a training and communications program related to officer wellness
as well as the development of a comprehensive suicide initiative. Finally, the decree
requires training for supervisors to recognize the signs and symptoms of alcoholism and
substance abuse and how to recommend appropriate support services.
I. Accountability and Transparency
The consent decree includes a fifty-two-page section implementing numerous
reforms intended to ensure accountability for police misconduct by strengthening and
improving coordination among the various oversight agencies, such as COPA and the
Police Board, that have come into existence in response to Chicago’s long and uniquely
troubling history of police misconduct directed toward African American communities.
The consent decree provides for greater transparency at all stages of misconduct
investigations through the requirement that each complaint is assigned a unique tracking
number that, by 2020, members of the public can use to track the status of complaints
online. The decree requires that COPA and Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) complete
investigations within 180 days and that district-level complaints and investigations are
completed within 90 days.
The provisions of the CBA with the union have been identified as containing several
provisions that are impediments to reform, particularly with respect to accountability and
transparency. While the consent decree does not re-write those provisions, it does require
the City to make changes to its policies and practices when not explicitly prohibited by the
agreement and to use best efforts to renegotiate highlighted problematic provisions,
including the affidavit requirement, the bar on anonymous complaints, and the destruction
of disciplinary records. The decree also requires CPD to adopt policies and practices to
encourage and protect officers who report misconduct and expressly prohibits retaliation
against members of the public who report misconduct. However, what the consent decree
was not able to solve is the disjointed system of accountability, as set up through ordinance
and the CBAs. Thus, the accountability system governing the CPD remains fragmented,
with at least three different bodies having jurisdiction over complaints.
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J. Data Collection, Analysis, and Management

Police professionals and scholars have known for decades that genuine
accountability requires more than just addressing serious misconduct after it occurs. While
this is critical, supervisors should “identify those officers who are engaged in problematic
behavior before this behavior has resulted in clear violations of law or policy” so that
officers’ practices can be corrected.385 The consent decree requires implementation of an
automated electronic system that enables supervisors to proactively identify at-risk
behavior by officers under their command and to provide individualized interventions and
support to address problematic behavior.
****
The case we brought against the City of Chicago, the approach we took and the
roadmap for reform laid out in the consent decree is a path that no state Attorney General
had taken before on this scale. However, we committed the resources and demonstrated
how, with a strong dedication to the community and the police department, to put in place
a roadmap to genuine reform. In an era where DOJ has abdicated its responsibility to
address patterns and practices of misconduct in police departments, other state and local
government lawyers can follow this example and step into that void.
VII. LOOKING FORWARD
“The citizens of this city are demanding justice. Communities are crying for peace
in their neighborhoods. . . [w]e need healing and hope in this city, and this consent decree
will provide it. I look forward to seeing that day.”386
Shortly after the appointment of the independent monitor, Chicago held its next
municipal election. Lori Lightfoot, the former chair of the Police Board and head of PATF,
was elected mayor.
Attorney General Kwame Raoul, who in January 2019 was sworn in, has expressed
his commitment to continuing the important work we achieved in reaching a consent decree
to govern Chicago police reform.
The consent decree is in effect, and reform deadlines and requirements are coming
due with a heavy drumbeat of community demand for change. With a new mayor, a new
attorney general, and the appointment of an independent monitor, in Judge Dow’s words,
“Let us begin.”387
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